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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This appeal decides whether Mark Lankford will spend rest of his life in 
prison, without any hope or chance of parole, based on nothing more than his proximity 
to the crime scene and jailhouse snitches. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In the fall of 1984, Mark Lankford and his brother, Bryan Lankford, were both 
convicted and sentenced to death for the 1983 murders of Robert and Cheryl Bravence. 1 
Lankford v. Arave, 468 F.3d 578, 579-80 (9th Cir), cert. denied, U.S. 943 (2007); 
State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 864 (1989). After years of litigation, the United States 
Supreme Court overturned Bryan's death sentence because the State failed to provide him 
with notice that death could be imposed, Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991), while 
Mark's judgment of conviction and sentence were vacated due to an erroneous jury 
instruction that failed to inform jurors they needed more than Bryan's uncorroborated 
testimony to find Mark guilty. Lankford v. Arave, 468 F.3d at 592. The Ninth Circuit 
ordered the federal district court to grant Mark's federal habeas petition and instructed 
the state court "to retry Mark Lankford within a reasonable time or release him."2 Id. 
Numerous pretrial motions in limine were filed by Mark's counsel, including one 
to exclude discussion or reference to the prior trial, conviction and sentence in this case. 
(R., pp.48-49, 54-55; 11/21/07 Hrg. Tr., p.36, Ls.2-23.) The prosecutor agreed that 
1 Because the testimony of Mark, Bryan and a number of the Lankford brothers was 
offered at trial and sentencing, each will be referred to herein by their first names, rather 
than "Mr. Lankford," to avoid confusion. 
1 
Mark's pnor charges, pnor conviction, and pnor incarceration in this case were 
inadmissible. (11/27 /07 Hrg. Tr., p.36, Ls.8-23.) At the next hearing, the prosecutor 
objected to the exclusion of evidence of Mark's prior trial and asked the district court to 
reconsider. (12/13/07 Hrg. Tr., p.99, L.20 - p.105, L. 11.) The defense objected, and the 
Court took the matter under advisement. (Id.) 
The defense advised the State and the Court that it would not object to the State's 
request to reference the fact that Mark was being held in the Latah County jail as a result 
of the murder charges, or otherwise dispute the admissibility of testimony that Mark was 
arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents in Texas in 1983. (12/13/07 
Hrg. Tr., p.110, Ls.6-18.) The defense moved in liminc to exclude Mark's criminal record 
preceding the instant offense, arguing Idaho Rules of Evidence (IRE) 609, 403 and 
404(b) prohibited the admission of any felony conviction older than ten years. (12/13/07 
Hrg. Tr., p.115, L.7 p.116, L.24, p.151, L.14 p.152, L.22.) The State objected, 
arguing at the time of the instant offense, Mark's prior convictions were not ten years old, 
but noted that it had not moved to admit Mark's prior criminal record, implying it would 
not seek such admission. (12/13/07 Hrg. Tr., p.116, Ls.17-24.) The Court ruled that it 
was inclined to exclude Mark's prior felony convictions because of their age, but would 
allow the State to argue the relevance and prejudice issues again, outside the jury's 
presence, if Mark testified. (12/27/07 Hrg. Tr., p.185, L.25 p.187, L.15, p.227, L.23 
p.229, L.12.) 
2 Statements by the prosecution and the district court judge indicate the federal court 
ordered Mark to be retried within 120 days of his case being returned to state court, or be 
set free. (R., pp.16, 166, 172.) 
2 
The defense sought clarification from the Court that all of its pretrial rulings, 
including motions in limine, would be binding at trial. (12/13/07 Hrg. Tr., p.116, L.25 
p.118, L.25.) The Court indicated that would be the case, advising the parties that the 
Court's rulings would apply at trial and if either party sought an exception to a prior 
order, the matter would have to be taken up outside the presence of the jury; the parties 
agreed with this approach. (Id.) 
Over defense objection, the Court agreed to allow the State to present the prior 
sworn testimony of witnesses who were now deceased but who testified at the original 
trial, so long as the testimony was read directly from the prior transcripts. (12/27 /07 Hrg. 
Tr., p.148, L.20 - p.15 l, L.12.) The Court also denied the State's motion to admit 
evidence of Mark's character traits, unless he testified and put his character at issue. 
(1/10/08 Hrg. Tr., p.188, Ls.21-25.) Prior to trial, the State stipulated that the Bravences 
were killed on June 21, 1983, at about 9:15 p.m. (1/10/08 Hrg. Tr., p.192, Ls.17-25.) 
According to the amended inf01mation, the State alleged Mark committed two counts of 
first degree felony murder in Idaho County on June 21, 1983. (R., pp.355-56.) 
Specifically, the State alleged Mark "was a principal to or aided and abetted in the 
commission of a robbery during which a murder of Robert Bravence [ and Cheryl 
Bravence] occurred. All of such acts constitute a violation of Idaho Code 
section 18-4003( d)." (Id.) 
According to the evidence elicited at trial, the Bravences were last seen alive 
camped at Sheep Creek, a flat area just below Castle Creek, about a half mile above the 
McAlister campground in Idaho County, on June 21 st·, 1983, just before dark. (Tr., p.550, 
3 
Ls.4-18, p.559, Ls.3-24, p.566, L.12 - p.567, L.7, p.568, L.25 p.570, L.13.)3 They were 
in a greenish colored Volkswagen van and had their dog, a black and white husky, with 
them. (Tr., p.547, L.17 - p.549, L.17.) The next morning, the couples' van was gone from 
the Sheep Creek camping spot, and the person who took the camping spot found a dog 
tied up to a bush on a three foot rope, but its owners were nowhere to be found. 
(Tr., p.567, Ls.3-17, p.568, L.12 - p.571, L.10, p.571, L.23 - p.572, L.18, p.571, Ls.12-
23.) The dog's tag listed its name as Phantom, and its owners as the Bravences. 
(Tr., p.594, L.12 -~ p.595, L.25.) 
On June 21, 1983, Darrell Cox, a miner and logger, was driving when he came 
across two men at 6:00 or 6:30 p.m., walking along Santiam road in Idaho County. 
(Tr., p.623, L.21 - 624, L.9, p.626, L.6 - p.628, L.16.) One man was in his early 20s, the 
other was in his late 20s. (Tr., p.629, Ls.1-18.) Mr. Cox offered the men a ride to their 
destination-the McAlister Campground- and they accepted; the older man was the larger 
of the two and sat in the front seat, while the younger, slimmer man sat in the backseat. 
(Tr., p.629, L.19 - p.630, L.2.) The younger man was carrying a shotgun. (Tr., p.631, 
Ls.12-23.) 
A family having a picnic at the McAlister Campground noticed the two men 
being dropped off by Mr. Cox at about 7: 15 or 7: 30 p.m., and observed the thinner man 
3 The clerk's record and transcripts consist of numerous volumes, including a 
supplemental clerk's record and supplemental transcripts from various post-trial hearings. 
For ease of reference, the clerk's record will be cited herein as "R." while the 
supplemental clerk's record will be cited as "Supp. R." Documents augmented into the 
appellate record will be identified by the date of filing and the document title. Transcripts 
from pretrial hearings, the jury trial and sentencing that are contained in the ten 
consecutively paginated volumes will be cited herein as "Tr." Transcripts of specific 
hearings not contained in these ten volumes will be cited by the date and type of hearing, 
i.e., 8/5/13 Rule 35 Hrg. Tr., p. l, Ls.1-5. 
4 
had a shotgun (Tr., p.666, Ls.8-14, p.677, Ls.1-3.) The family saw the men talking to 
each other, looking over at the family, looking at the family's ear, and talking some more. 
From what they could see, the stockier of the two men did most of the talking. 
(Tr., p.666, Ls.15-25, p.678, Ls.20-25.) The men talked for about fifteen to twenty 
minutes. (Tr., p.667, Ls.1-5, p.685, Ls.7-21, p.686, Ls.2-3.) The family thought the men 
were concerning enough that they started to pack up and leave the area. (Tr., p.667, Ls.6-
25) The men left the area before the family left, walking toward the bathroom area, but 
the family did not see where the men went. (Tr., p.668, L.1 - p.669, L. 13.) 
Subsequently, on September 23, 1983, Lee Vonbargen and his wife took one of 
their sons up to the Summit Flats area to go archery hunting. (Tr., p.405, L. 18 - p.406, 
L.17, p.407, Ls.6-9.) While his son went hunting, Mr. Vonbargen "made a load of wood." 
(Tr., p.406, Ls.4-6.) About 45 minutes after they arrived, Mr. Vonbargen walked about 
50 yards from his camp to some lodgepoles, when he noticed a blue tarp or poncho. 
(Tr., p.408, Ls.7-17, p.490, L.24 - p.410, L. 1.) Mr. Vonbargen had never seen it before 
and walked over to investigate. (Tr., p.408, Ls.14-19.) When he got there, he could see 
two bodies mostly covered by the tarp, with one laying on the ground and the other 
laying on top of that body. (Tr., p.409, Ls.6-22.) It was still light outside, getting close to 
about 5:00 p.rn. when he made the discovery, but because his son had already left for the 
night to hunt, he went back to his camp, told his wife about his discovery and then waited 
until their son returned the next morning to notify authorities. (Tr., p.410, L.2 p.411, 
L.2.) As soon as his son returned, Mr. Vonbargen went directly to the Idaho County 
Sheriffs Office to tell them what he found. (Tr., p.411, Ls.3-15.) Once Mr. Vonbargen 
5 
led sheriff deputies to the location where he found the bodies, he went home. (Tr., p.411, 
L.16 p.412, L.13.) 
Sheriff deputies roped off the area where the bodies were located, took 
photographs and began looking for evidence. (Tr., p.425, L.22 p.426, L.2, p.436, Ls.8-
25.) No weapons were ever found in the area. (Tr., p.437, Ls.1-2.) The bodies were 
placed in body bags, removed from the area and transported to the Noland Funeral Home. 
(Tr., p.432, Ls.21-23, p.832, L.25 - p.835, L.21.) About 3/10 of a mile from where the 
bodies were found, officers found a brown Z28 Camaro camouflaged with branches and 
tree limbs. (Tr., p.762, Ls.2-16, p.763, Ls.1-10.) The car was towed to Grangeville, 
placed in police storage and searched. (Tr., p.766, Ls.9-23.) Deputies found camping 
gear, clothing, personal effects, and photographs in the car, which bore Texas license 
plates. (Tr., p.767, Ls.1-17.) Some of the photographs included pictures of Mark and 
Bryan Lankford. (Tr., p.767, L.24 -p.771, L.4.) 
The two men were later linked to hotel and restaurant charges made with the 
victims' credit cards in the days and weeks following their disappearance, including a 
charge at the Ranch Motel in Pendleton, Oregon, on June 22, 1983, sometime between 2 
a.m. and 6 a.m. (Tr., p.709, L.3 - p.716, L.22, p.708, Ls.3-24.) The clerk from the Ranch 
Motel saw a Volkswagen Van parked at the motel at about 9 a.m. on June 22, 1983. 
(Tr., p. 712, L.12 p. 719, L.16.) The clerk saw one man in the van, and one man outside 
the van, and identified both men as the people he had checked in sometime between 2 
and 6 a.m. that morning, using the Bravences' credit card to pay for the room. (Tr., p.719, 
L.15 - p.720, L.9.) 
6 
Robert Cihak, a pathologist, conducted two autopsies on the Bravences and 
testified at trial. (Tr., p.1012, L.19 - p.1015, L.21.) fn conducting the autopsies, Dr. Cihak 
consulted with other experts to assist him with the reconstruction of the Bravence's 
skulls. (Tr., p.1014, L.7 - p.1016, L.19.) Dr. Cihak testified to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty that the cause of Cheryl's death was blunt trauma to the skull, and that 
there were at least three areas of force delivered to Cheryl's skull. (Tr., p.1025, L.20 -
p.1026, L.14.) Dr. Cihak testified to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the 
cause of Robert's death was also blunt force trauma to the skull, and there were at last 
two areas of force delivered to his skull. (Tr., p.1027, L.12 - p.1028, L.10.) Cheryl also 
had a fracture of the joint on her right fifth finger on her right hand (Tr., p. l 016, L.23 --
p.1017, L.8), and Robert had a fracture in the lateral aspect of the right side of his 
collarbone. (Tr., p. l O 17, Ls.9-11.) The Bravences had no other injuries. 
The defense offered testimony from the chief medical examiner for the State of 
Utah, Dr. Todd Grey, also a forensic pathologist. (Tr., p.1415, Ls.12-21.) Dr. Grey 
testified that, based on his review of the evidence of injuries to Cheryl's skull, there were 
"at least three different sites that I can see where have been impacts: Specifically the right 
frontal and side region, the right back, and then the left front and side regions, at least 
three." (Tr., p.1430, Ls.11-18.) Dr. Grey concluded the amount of force necessary to 
inflict this damage would be "a lot." (Tr., p.1430, Ls.19-25.) Similarly, Dr. Gray testified 
that based on his review of the fractures he observed in Robert's skull, there was "a lot of 
force being delivered to this victim's head, and at least two different points of impact." 
(Tr., p.1432, Ls.14-22.) Dr. Grey testified the injuries to the Bravences' skulls could not 
7 
have been inflicted by blows to the back of their heads, as such a conclusion was 
inconsistent with the evidence: 
[T]he pattern of injury that we're seeing on these skulls is injuries across 
the front, both on the right and left sides of the head, and in the case of 
Ms. Bravcnce, a single area of injury on the right back of the head. So the 
scenario of these people dying only because of blows to the back of the 
head docs not match what we are seeing on the skulls. 
(Tr., p.1434, Ls.3-16.) 
Over defense objection, the State presented testimony from two jailhouse 
snitches: Lane Thomas4 and Bryan Lankford. (Tr., p.1245, L. 10 - p.1270, L.6 (Lane 
Thomas's trial testimony), Tr., p.1273, L.12 - p.1400, L.1 (Bryan's trial testimony).) 
Lane testified that while he was incarcerated at the Latah County Jail, he was 
housed in the same unit with Mark. (Tr., p.1246, L.22 - p.1247, L.12.) Lane testified that 
he did not know anything about Mark or his case before he met him in the jail. He 
claimed to have no knowledge of Mark prior to being housed with him at the jail 
(Tr., p.1247, Ls.15-25.) Lane said he and Mark talked about why they were in jail and 
played dominoes together. (Tr., p.1248, Ls.1-24.) Lane claimed Mark told him he and his 
brother came across a campsite with a van that had Texas plates; they intended to steal 
the van and while they were looking for the keys, a man came running up. (Tr., p.1248, 
L.21 p.1249, L.20.) Bryan hit the guy in the head with a shotgun and knocked him out. 
4 Mark's lead trial attorney, Charles Kovis, previously represented Lane Thomas in 
criminal matters. The State brought the issue or prior representation to the Court's 
attention. (12/27/07 Hrg. Tr., p.158, Ls.9-23.) The Court noted that Mr. Kovis was bound 
by professional constraints and obligations, and if it were to become an issue, the Court 
would take the issue up in-camera. (12/27/07 Hrg. Tr., p.158, L.24 - p.159, L.24.) 
Mr. Kovis represented to the Court and counsel that his co-counsel, Mr. Hallin, would be 
handling the cross-examination of Mr. Thomas, not him. (12/27/07 Hrg. Tr., p.159, L.25 
-p.160, L.14.) 
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(Tr., p.1249, Ls.18-21, p.1250, L.24 p.1251, L.2.) A lady came running up while Bryan 
was searching the man's pocket for keys, so according to Lane, Mark hit her in head with 
the gun. (Tr., p.1249, L.21 - p.1250, L.9.) After they found the keys to the van, one of 
them found a rock and hit the man in the head with it, and then did the same with the 
woman. (Tr., p.1249, L.25 - p.1250, L.5.) They took the rock and threw it in the creek by 
the camp, and then took the bodies and buried them under sticks and leaves and brush 
and then went to California. (Tr., p.1250, Ls.1-17.) Lane then testified that after he was 
listed as a State's witness, he told different stories to people, including his attorney; he 
also testified that before he changed his story, Mark told him he "was a dead man 
walking" and if he ever repeated anything Mark told him, "he would make sure that I was 
dead." (Tr., p.1258, L.17 - p.1259, L.8.) 
Lane testified that he called his lawyer from the North Idaho Correctional 
Institution (NICI) and in the presence of two correctional officers, told his attorney a 
different story and admitted Mark did not confess to him. (Tr., p.1258, Ls.2-16.) Lane 
claimed he told the new story because he had been threatened and twice assaulted while 
in NICI. (Tr., p.1258, Ls.15-21.) Lane admitted telling Mark's investigator that no one 
had threatened him to change his story, and that what he had told the police officers about 
Mark's alleged confession was a lie. (Tr., p.1266, L.3 - p.1267, L.3.) Lane also admitted 
that he got in an argument with Mark over the volume on the television and told Mark's 
investigator that he (Lane) "just jumped out of bed and I fucking went off on him. I 
started yelling at him. I told him I was going to kick his ass if he didn't turn it down. [. ]" 
(Tr., p.1267, Ls.4-24.) Lane also admitted he told Mark's investigator that the facts 
underlying Mark's "confession" to him came from Bryan's written confession, which 
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Mark had shown Lane in jail. {Tr., p.1267, L.25 - p.1268, L.10.) Lane testified he lied 
about everything he told Mark's investigator, as well as his own lawyer, because he was 
afraid. (Tr., 1268, L.23 - p.1269, L.22.) Notably, Lane Thomas was identified as an 
alternate perpetrator in the murder of Tonya Hart; he admitted to and bragged about 
killing Ms. Hart to different people, including a Latah County officer. State v. Meister, 
148 Idaho 236, 239-42 (2009); State v. Meister, 2013 WL 3579663, *8-*9 (Appellant's 
BriefJuly 2, 2013). 
Lane testified that in exchange for his testimony, the prosecutor's office would 
write a letter of cooperation to NICI in Cottonwood, telling them that he cooperated with 
the investigation of Mark and testified truthfully at his trial.5 {Tr., p.2157, Ls.12-22.) 
Other than the cooperation letter, Lane said he was testifying because he was "just being 
honest." (Tr., p.1259, Ls.20-23.) During cross-examination, Lane admitted he was 
serving a 180 day retained jurisdiction at NICI, which would be followed by a prison 
sentence of eighteen months to three years if the judge did not put him on probation. 
(Tr., p.1260, L.4-p.1261, L.4.) He also admitted the prosecutor told him ifhe testified 
against Mark, he would not face perjury charges for contrary statements he had made. 
(Tr., p.1262, Ls.14-22.) 
Bryan Lankford also testified for the State. (Tr., p.1273, Ls.7-12.) Bryan testified 
he left Texas because he got a drinking-related ticket while on probation and was told by 
his probation officer the violation would land him in prison. (Tr., p.1276, Ls.1-9.) Mark 
called Bryan, told Bryan he was leaving Texas, and the two men left in Mark's Z28 
5 Lane claimed the "offer" had not been made to him until after he had already agreed to 
testify against Mark. (Tr., p.1263, Ls.9-17.) 
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Camara en route to Canada. (Tr., p.1276, L.15 -p.1277, L.21.) Bryan testified that once 
they got to Idaho and set up camp about 30 miles outside of Grangeville, they walked 
everywhere. (Tr., p.1279, L.5 - p.1282, L.3.) Bryan testified that on June 21, 1983, he 
and Mark left the camp to go to Golden, a small town, so Bryan could call a friend and 
get money wired to them. (Tr., p.1282, Ls.7-15.) When they left, they covered Mark's car 
with limbs and walked about five miles before a man who identified himself as Darrel 
Cox, stopped and picked them up. (Tr., p.1283, Ls.7-14, p.1284, L.15 p.1285, L.3.) 
Bryan testified he said in the front seat, of Mr. Cox's car, while Mark sat in the back. 
(Tr., p.1285, Ls.4-13.) Mr. Cox let them out near a campground, where Bryan 
remembered there being a family with a white car. (Tr., p.1285, L.14 -p.1286, L.14.) 
When they got out of Mr. Cox's car, Bryan and Mark walked up the road to the 
camp about half a mile. (Tr., p.1286, Ls.15-24.) Bryan testified he and Mark talked about 
walking to Golden, getting money wired, and then going from there. (Tr., p.1287, Ls. I 0-
16.) At that point, Bryan testified Mark came up with a plan to steal a car. (Tr., p.1287, 
Ls.16-21.) Bryan testified Mark wanted to steal a car but he did not; at the time, Bryan 
testified he and Mark were both inebriated from drinking Jack Daniels. (Tr., p.1288, 
Ls.13-20.) 
The two men kept walking and eventually came to Sheep Creek Campground 
where they saw a man and woman and a van. (Tr., p.1288, Ls.1-10.) Bryan testified he 
agreed to be a lookout to distract the people while Mark went around back and took the 
van. (Tr., p.1288, Ls.20-23, p.1290, L.16.) Bryan testified he went into the camp and 
talked to the man while the woman went down to the creek to wash some pans. 
(Tr., p.1290, L.17 - p.1291, L.5.) Bryan testified he talked to the man for about five 
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minutes when Mark ran into the camp with a club, screaming for everyone to get down 
on the ground. (Tr., p.1291, Ls.4-12.) Bryan had the shot gun with him when he went into 
the camp. (Tr., p.1291, L.20 ·-p.1292, L.16.) Bryan described the club Mark had as being 
about two inches around in diameter, a foot long, and made of purpleheart wood. 
(Tr., p.1292, L.17 - p.1293, L.21.) Bryan testified he or his ex-wife had given Mark the 
club years before. (Tr., p.1293, Ls.6-21.) 
Bryan testified the man got on the ground and Mark hit him twice across the back 
of the head with the club, and when the woman returned to the camp, Mark yelled at her 
to get on the ground, and he did the same thing to her, hitting her on the back of the head 
with the club at least two or three times. (Tr., p.1293, L.23 p.1294, L.8.) The two men 
then cleaned up the camp site, put everything in the van and then loaded the bodies in the 
van. (Tr., p.1294, Ls.10-25.) Bryan then drove them to their camp where the Camara was 
parked. (Tr., p.1295, Ls.2-8, p.1296, L.17 - p.1297, L.3.) Mark told Bryan where to stop 
once they reached the area where the campsite was; at that time, Bryan testified he 
believed the Bravences were still alive. (Tr., p.1298, L.10-p.1299, L.9.) Bryan testified 
that Mark got out of the van and took either the man or woman with him, was gone for 
five to ten minutes, and then did the same thing with the other person. (Tr., p.1299, L.18 
- p.1301, L.23.) Mark then got back in the vehicle, and they went back to their camp to 
pick up some items. (Tr., p.1302, L.15 - p.1303, L.l.) With Bryan driving, he and Mark 
left the camp area and drove toward Washington. (Tr., p.1304, Ls.1-6.) They stayed at a 
hotel the first night, and paid for it using the Bravences' credit card or cashier's checks; 
they continued down to Los Angeles, California, using the Bravences' credit card to pay 
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their expenses along the way. (Tr., p.1306, L.4 p.1307, L.18, p.1308, L.22 - p.1312, 
L.7.) 
After being in Los Angeles for a while, Bryan testified that Mark got rid of the 
van, leaving it in a "slum area[,]" while Bryan talked to Roy Ralmuto, a friend in Texas, 
about sending money for bus tickets. (Tr., p.1313, L.l - p.1314, L.3.) Mr. Ralmuto paid 
for the bus tickets and the Lankford brothers took the bus to San Antonio, where 
Mr. Ralmuto picked them up. (Tr., p.1314, L.4 - p.1315, L.2.) Bryan and Mark stayed 
with Mr. Ralmuto for a few months, and then with their other brother, Robert Lankford, 
for a few days. (Tr., p.1315, L.9 p.1316, L.15.) Subsequently, Mark and Bryan went 
camping at the Trinity River in Texas, taking about a week's worth of supplies with 
them. (Tr., p.1318, L.2 p.1319, L.25.) Bryan admitted that he took a knife from the 
Bravences with him to Trinity River and carved his initials in the knife. (Tr., p.1320, 
Ls.11-19.) Eventually, Mark and Bryan were arrested at their campground on the Trinity 
River in Texas, and taken into custody on October 3, 1983. (Tr., p.1165, L.13 -- p.1168, 
L.15, p.1321, Ls.7-15.) 
Bryan confessed to FBI Agent Ploeger and later memorialized his confession in a 
written statement. (Tr., p.1322, Ls.4-23.) That written confession, along with Agent 
Ploeger's five-page report documenting his interview with Bryan, was admitted as 
evidence by stipulation of the parties. (R., State's Exs. 76, 197; Tr., p.1272, Ls.1-25.) 
Bryan admitted that he changed his story about what happened with the Bravences on 
numerous occasions, claiming he did so to survive in prison; Bryan admitted he had 
testified under oath that he killed the Bravences, he had given interviews to the media to 
that effect and he had written letters admitting that he killed the Bravences, and had lied 
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to numerous people when he said he did not kill them, including his family. (Tr., p.1322, 
L.24 p.1327, L.19, p.1339, L.12 p.1357, L.25.) 
Bryan testified about a notarized letter he wrote in 2003 explaining that it was his 
decision to steal the van because he was tired of walking, that Mark's efforts to talk him 
out of it were unsuccessful and when he walked toward the camp where the van was, he 
looked back and saw Mark walking the opposite direction away from him. (Tr., p.1362, 
L.9 - p.1363, L.24.) In the letter, Bryan admitted acting alone in the Bravcnces' murders, 
seeking Mark's assistance to dispose of the bodies after the fact, and bragged about how 
easy it was to fool the Grangeville police, district attorney and judges. (Tr., p.1367, L.8 -
p.1369, L.2.) 
Bryan admitted that each time he testified and implicated Mark in the theft of the 
van and the murder of the Bravences, he received something favorable in exchange for 
that testimony. (Tr., p.1369, L.6 p.1370, L.4.) Bryan also agreed that when he made 
statements or offered testimony implicating himself in the theft of the van and the murder 
of the Bravences, he did so without the promise of any benefit in exchange for those 
statements or testimony. (Tr., p.1370, L.6 p.1373, L.22.) 
Bryan admitted that in exchange for his testimony, the prosecutor agreed to try to 
get him transferred to an undisclosed out-of-state prison, and help him get his name 
changed. (Tr., p.1329, L.21 - p.1331, L.5.) Bryan also admitted the prosecutor was 
getting him a parole hearing in 2008, even though he was not scheduled for a hearing 
until 2015, and both the prosecutor and the detective, Skott Mealer, agreed to testify on 
Bryan's behalf at the parole hearing. (Tr., p.1331, Ls.5-24, p.1334, L.21 p.1335, L.18.) 
In addition, the prosecutor promised to write a letter on Bryan's behalf telling the parole 
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board that he was cooperative at Mark's trial. (Tr., p.1332, Ls.1-13.) Finally, the 
prosecutor provided Bryan with immunity from prosecution for perjury based on the 
different testimony and statements Bryan had given under oath in the past about the 
Bravences' murders. (Tr., p.1332, Ls.14-22.) 
After the State rested, the defense moved for a motion of acquittal, arguing the 
State had failed to present substantial evidence of every clement of the charged offenses. 
(Tr., p.1551, Ls.1-10, p.1579, L.17 p.1580, L. 1.) The Court denied the motion, 
concluding that "if it were just Bryan Lankford this would be a lot tougher decision. But 
with the testimony of Lane Thomas I find it much easier to deny the motion." 
(Tr., p.1580, Ls.3-13.) 
The defense then presented testimony from Mark, witnesses who testified that 
Lane and Bryan both had a reputation for being dishonest, a friend of Mark's from Texas 
who stayed in contact with him and who testified he never admitted to killing the 
Bravences. (Tr., p.1582, L.8 p.1688, L.14, p.1695, L.3 p.1701, L.3, p.1704, L.4 -
p.1716, L.9, p.1717, L.13 - p.1722, L.21.) The defense also called Dr. Madeline Hinkes, 
a professor of anthropology at San Diego Mesa College and the anthropology consultant 
for the San Diego and Imperial County medical examiners. (Tr., p.1739, L.20 - p.1742, 
L.21.) Dr. Hinkes testified she had been asked to consult on this case by deputy attorney 
general Anderson in 2002. (Tr., p.1743, Ls.2-23.) Dr. Hinkes testified she told 
Mr. Anderson that she agreed with Dr. Grey's findings and based on her training and 
experience, the Bravences were not killed by being struck by a club or shotgun butt 
(Tr., p.1746, L.11 - p.1750, L.25.) 
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Mark testified that in May of 1983, he worked in finance accounting for an oil 
company in Houston, Texas. (Tr., p.1582, L.24 -- p.1583, L.25.) He got tired of the rat 
race and wanted something different, so he decided to leave his job and Texas. 
(Tr., p.1584, Ls.3-11.) At that time, his brother, Bryan, was on probation for robbery and 
had recently been arrested for DUI. (Tr., p.1585, Ls.16-19.) After talking to his probation 
officer, Bryan was certain he would go to prison for violating his probation, so he asked 
to go with Mark. (Tr., p.1585, Ls.16-25.) Mark drove and the two traveled through 
Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado and Wyoming before making their way to Idaho. 
(Tr., p.1586, Ls.8-23.) After traveling to different parts of Idaho, Mark and Bryan ended 
up at Summit Flat. (Tr., p.1587, Ls.2-16.) When he left Texas, Mark had $1,500 in cash 
and an American Express card. (Tr., p.1587, Ls.20-25.) In addition, he had brought 
camping gear, fishing gear, hunting gear, personal possessions, food and various 
provisions. (Tr., p.1588, Ls.1-25.) 
When Mark and Bryan got to Summit Flat, they parked Mark's car and covered it 
up with brush to conceal it; Mark was sure that Bryan was wanted by Texas authorities at 
that point. (Tr., p.1589, L.25 p.1590, L.22.) Mark testified that he could not remember 
what day they arrived at Summit Flat, but based on other information and testimony he 
had heard, he believed it was probably June 16, 1983. (Tr., p.1590, L.24 - p.1591, L.9.) 
As time went on, Bryan complained more about the weather, their living conditions, and 
wanting to return to Texas. (Tr., p.1591, L.23 -p.1592, L.9.) 
On June 21, at about 3:00 or 4:00 in the afternoon, Bryan and Mark left the camp 
for Grangeville, because Bryan wanted to go back home to Texas. (Tr., p.1594, L.24 -
p.1595, L.6.) Mark thought Grangeville was about 15 miles away, and before he left, he 
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made sure the car was covered completely with tree limbs and the campfire was 
concealed, intending to return. (Tr., p.1595, L.21 p.1596, L.20.) Bryan brought a day 
pack with him, as well as his 12 gauge shotgun. (Tr., p.1597, Ls.12-25, p.1598, L.21 --
p.1599, L.20.) Mark testified although he was going to Grangeville with Bryan, he 
intended to return to the camp after leaving Bryan in Grangeville to find a way back to 
Texas on his own. (Tr., p.1599, Ls.17-22.) 
Mark testified he had to use the restroom and that was why Mr. Cox stopped at 
the McAlister campground; Mark thought Mr. Cox would take him and Bryan all the way 
to Grangeville, but while he was in the restroom, Bryan told Mr. Cox he could leave. 
(Tr., p.1604, Ls.1-24.) Mark and Bryan argued at the campground and then after about 45 
minutes, when it was starting to get dark, Mark decided to leave. (Tr., p.1607, L.9 -
p.1608, L. 10.) Before he left, he gave Bryan $50 and told him not to do anything stupid. 
(Tr., p.1608, Ls.11-15.) Mark then started walking back toward the camp, using the same 
road they had gone down with Mr. Cox. (Tr., p.1608, Ls. 16-25.) Mark walked about a 
quarter to half mile before he was picked up by someone in a red Ford truck who drove 
him three or four more miles and then let him off because that was as far as they were 
going. (Tr., p.1609, Ls.1-14.) Mark waited, hoping another car would come along and 
give him a ride, and when no cars came, he started walking again. (Tr., p.1609, Ls.16-
23.) At this point it was dark. (Tr., p.1610, Ls.24-25.) 
As Mark walked further down the road toward his camp, he saw a light coming 
from a vehicle. (Tr., p.1611, pp.1-8.) When the vehicle pulled up, it was Bryan driving a 
van. (Tr., p.1611, Ls.9-19.) Mark asked Bryan where he got the van, and noticed Bryan 
was acting strangely; he was hyper, extremely tense, smoking quickly and not talking 
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normally. (Tr., p.1612, Ls.1-11.) Bryan said he took the van from some people, but would 
not elaborate, so Mark kept asking him more questions. (Tr., p.1612, Ls.12-25.) Bryan 
eventually admitted that he knocked some people out and took their van. (Tr., p.1613, 
Ls.3-8.) Mark told Bryan to go back to where the people were that he knocked out to 
check on them. (Tr., p.1613, Ls.8-22.) Bryan drove them back to the area and when they 
pulled up, Mark could see two people lying face down by a camp ring. (Tr., p.1613, L.22 
p.1614, L.5.) Mark got out of the van and checked each person for a pulse but found 
none. (Tr., p.1614, Ls.7-15.) Mark told Bryan the people were dead and asked him what 
happened. (Tr., p.1614, L.16 p.1615, L.5.) Bryan admitted that he went into the camp, 
saw the man and started talking to him. He threatened the man, told him to lay down on 
the ground, and the man told Bryan to take the van and the money. (Tr., p.1615, L. 13 
p.1616, L.l.) Instead, Bryan hit the man in the back of the head with the shotgun butt, 
made sure he was knocked out and then began searching for keys and money, when he 
heard a noise. (Tr., p.1616, Ls.1-7.) He turned and saw a woman walking into the camp 
from the river, and when she saw the man on the ground, she asked if he was hurt. 
(Tr., p.1616, Ls.7-14.) The woman went toward the man and Bryan told her to get on the 
ground, and he hit her with the shotgun butt. (Tr., p.1616, Ls.11-18.) Bryan noticed the 
man moving, so he hit him again with the shotgun butt, and then picked up a rock and 
dropped it on the man's head until he quit moving, and did the same thing with the 
woman, but not as many times. (Tr. p.1616, L.21 p.1617, L.6.) 
Mark and Bryan decided to put the bodies in the van, the woman first and the man 
second. (Tr., p.1618, Ls.3-14.) Bryan drove them back to the area where they had been 
camped, and they both unloaded the bodies. (Tr., p.1619, Ls.1-21.) After that, they left in 
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the van, with Bryan still driving. (Tr., p.1620, L.20 p.1621, L.18.) Mark denied being 
present when the Bravences were killed, or taking any property from them, and denied 
ever confessing to anyone, let alone Lane Thomas, even though he did talk to Lane about 
his case. (Tr., p.1628, L.14 -- p.1630, L.25.) Mark denied ever threatening Lane or 
otherwise having any contact with him once he learned Lane was listed as a State 
witness. (Tr., p.1667, Ls.20-25.) 
After the defense rested, it renewed its motion for an acquittal, which the Court 
denied. (Tr., p.1759, Ls.5-21.) The State then presented a few rebuttal witnesses and 
rested. (Tr., p.1800, L.2.) The case was submitted to the jury, and four hours later, they 
returned with a verdict finding Mark guilty of two counts of first degree murder. 
(Tr., p.1890, L.5 -- p.1892, L.15.) Following a sentencing hearing where the State 
presented some live testimony and some prior testimony from a number of witnesses, 
including Mark's younger brother, Lee Lankford, and after Mark allocuted, the Court 
imposed consecutive fixed life sentences without the possibility of parole upon Mark. 
(Tr., p.2107, L.23 p.2108, L.15.) 
Mark filed a timely Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) motion for 
correction/reduction of sentence and a motion for hearing. (Supp. R., pp.9-11, 15.) Mark 
also filed a motion for a new trial, arguing he was prejudiced by the Court allowing the 
State to read into evidence prior witness testimony, in violation of Idaho Code 
section 19-2405 and the confrontation clause, and he was prejudiced when the Court 
advised jurors of his prior trial, conviction and appeal. ( 6/15/09 & 7 /29/09 Memorandum 
and Amended Memorandum in Support of Motion for a New Trial.) The Court denied the 
motion for a new trial, concluding no prejudice flowed from the jury hearing about 
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Mark's prior trial and conviction, and that Mark had not been denied his right to confront 
witnesses based on the manner by which prior testimony had been presented at his trial. 
(Supp. R., pp.49-62.) 
Subsequently, Mark filed a second motion for a new trial alleging newly 
discovered evidence that Bryan testified falsely at his trial. (Supp. R., pp.64-80.) The 
second motion was amended, and following a series of judge and lawyer changes, a final 
consolidated second motion for a new trial was filed, alleging: perjured trial testimony 
from Bryan and Lane Thomas; influenced trial testimony from Lee John Lankford; 
prosecutorial misconduct for eliciting perjured testimony from Lane and Bryan; 
violations of Brady v. Maryland6 by failing to disclose money the State paid to Lane for 
his testimony, money it paid to Lee Lankford to testify at sentencing,7 and its failure to 
disclose all terms of the deal it made with Bryan to testify, including arranging for Bryan 
to have a cell phone in his jail cell; and misconduct for violating the district court's 
January 7, 2008, discovery order regarding Lane. 8 (Supp. R., pp.623-784.) 
Following a hearing, the Court denied Mark's second motion for a new trial. 
(Supp. R., pp.893-917.) Thereafter, the district court denied Mark's Rule 35 motion to 
6 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that the State's suppression or withholding of exculpatory 
evidence violates Due Process where such evidence is material to guilt or punishment, 
regardless of the good or bad faith of the prosecution). 
7 In addition to travel and lodging expenses, Lee John was paid over $2,000, allegedly for 
lost wages and commissions during the time he was in Idaho to testify for the State at 
sentencing, but that information was never disclosed by the prosecutor to defense 
counsel. (Supp. R., pp.779-787 (Defendant's E.H. Bxs. HH, II, KK, LL & MM).) 
8 Mark's motion was supported by numerous exhibits, identified by consecutive single 
and double alphabetical letters, i.e., Ex. A, Ex. AA. (Supp. R., pp.644-787.) Mark also 
raised a claim that his former trial counsel had a conflict of interest in representing him 
because he had previously represented Lane Thomas in a criminal case. 
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reduce or correct an illegal sentence on jurisdictional grounds, finding the motion had 
been filed two days too late. (Supp. R., pp.957-963.) This appeal follows. 
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L THE WITH 
AMBIGUOUS INSTRUCTIONS WHICH RELIEVED THE 
STATE OF ITS BURDEN OF PROOF AND DEPRIVED HIM HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE UNITED 
STATES AND IDAHO CONSTITUTIONS? 
II. DID THE DISTRICT COURT'S INSTRUCTION ADVISING JURORS OF 
MARK'S PRIOR CHARGES, CONVICTIONS AND APPELLATE 
PROCEEDINGS FOR THE SAME OFFENSES IN THIS CASE VIOLATE 
MARK'S CONSTITUIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BEFORE AN 
IMPARTIAL JURY? 
III. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
MARK'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON THE COURT'S 
VIOLATIONS OF IDAHO CODE SECTION 19-2405? 
DID THE PROSECUTOR'S REPEATED REFERENCES TO AND 
ELICITATION OF TESTIMONY REGARDING MARK'S PRIOR BAD ACTS, 
PRIOR CONVICTION, DEATH SENTENCE AND CONFINEMENT ON 
DEATH ROW THROUGHOUT THE TRIAL, REPEATEDLY CALLING 
MARK A LIAR AND BOLSTERING ITS OWN WITNESSES' TESTIMONY 
IN CLOSING ARGUMENT, AND HIS SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE 
REGARDING DEALS HE MADE IN EXCHANGE FOR SNITCH 
TESTIMONY, CONSTITUTE MISCONDUCT ENTITLING MARK TO A 
NEW TRIAL? 
V. DOES THE ACCUMULATION OF TRIAL ERRORS REQUIRE REVERSAL 
OF MARK'S CONVICTION AND REMAND FOR A NEW TRIAL WHERE 
SUCH ERRORS DEPRIVED MARK OF DUE PROCESS AND HIS RIGHT TO 
A FAIR TRIAL? 
VI. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN DENYING MARK'S RULE 35 
MOTION TO CORRECT AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE, OR A SENTENCE 




COURT IN PROVIDING S WITH 
IMPROPER AND AMBIGUOUS INSTRUCTIONS WHICH DEPRIVED Hllvf OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND AF AIR TRIAL UNDER THE 
SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 7 AND 13 OF THE IDAHO 
CONSTITUTION 
A. Introduction 
The district court provided Mr. Lankford's jury with legally incorrect and 
conflicting explanations of the elements the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
in order for the jury to find Mr. Lankford guilty of felony murder. The erroneous and 
conflicting instructions violated Mr. Lankford's state and federal constitutional rights to 
due process and a fair trial, requiring this Court to vacate Mr. Lankford's judgment of 
conviction and sentence, and remand his case for a new trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Jury instructions which omit an element of the offense, thereby relieving the State 
of its burden of proving a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, violate Due 
Process and are reviewable for the first time on appeal, even absent an objection. State v. 
Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749 (2007). Because trial counsel did not object to the 
erroneous jury instructions, Mr. Lankford must demonstrate the instructional defects 
constitute fundamental error. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588 (2011). An 
instructional error is fundamental if it permits the State to gain a conviction without 
proving every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 587-88. Whether 
jury instructions fairly and properly present the issues and state the applicable law is a 
legal question over which this Court exercises free review. Id. at 588. Jury instructions 
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arc viewed as a whole, and instructional error requires reversal of a conviction when the 
collective instructions mislead the jury or prejudice a party, thereby depriving an accused 
of his or her fundamental right to due process. Id. 
C. The District Court Committed Reversible Error By Providing Mr. Lankford's Jury 
With Improper And Ambiguous Instructions That Deprived Him Of His 
Constitutional Rights To Due Process And A Fair Trial Under The State And 
Federal Constitutions 
Mr. Lankford's jury was provided with a number of improper and ambiguous jury 
instructions, when viewed as a whole, were misleading and prejudicial, allowing him to 
be convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder, without the State having to 
prove every element of those offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "in all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury .... " Similarly Article I,§ 7 of the Idaho Constitution provides that the right 
of jury trial shall remain inviolate, which includes a right to "a jury which has not been 
mislead [sic] by erroneous instructions to a defendant's prejudice .... " State v. Taylor, 59 
Idaho 724, 87 P.2d 454, 460 (1939). The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and the 
due process right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt are interrelated. Sullivan v. 
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,278 (1993). "The jury verdict required by the Sixth Amendment 
is a jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. Jury instructions which include 
an improper instruction on a contested element of the offense violate the Sixth 
Amendment's jury trial guarantee. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 12 (1999). 
A violation of these constitutional rights occurs not only when an instruction 
clearly misstates an element of the offense, but also when an ambiguous instruction is 
given "and there was 'a reasonable likelihood' that the jury applied the instruction in a 
24 
way that relieved the State of its burden of proving every clement of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt." See Waddington v. Sarcmsad, 555 U.S. 179, 190-91 (2009) (citation 
omitted); see also Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380-81 (1990). 9 A defendant "need 
not establish that the jury was more likely than not to have been impcnnissibly inhibited 
by instruction[.]" Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380. Instead, eITor occurs if there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury was given an ambiguous instruction and might have interpreted 
the instruction to prevent consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence, Calderon v. 
Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998), or may have applied it in a way that violates the 
Constitution. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 389-90 (1999). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States Supreme Court's 
standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States Constitution to Art. I, 
Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." A1aresh v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare ex 
rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227, 970 P.2d 14, 20 (1998) (citing Smith v. Idaho Dep't 
of Correction, 128 Idaho 768, 771, 918 P.2d 1213, 1216 (1996)). Thus, the federal due 
process requirement that the state bear the burden of proving all elements of the offense 
charged beyond a reasonable doubt is also a requirement of article I, section 13 of the 
Idaho Constitution. 
9 In Boyde, the United States Supreme Court specifically applied the reasonable 
likelihood standard to a claim that ambiguous jury instructions violated the Eighth 
Amendment. In subsequent cases, the Court applied somewhat different standards when 
considering ambiguous jury instruction claims brought under the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process guarantee of the application of the "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard. See Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), and Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 
391 (1991). However, the Court later recognized the arguably different standard in Cage 
and Yates, and clarified that there is a single standard of review for claims that jury 
instructions violated the federal constitution. The Court stated, "we now disapprove the 
standard of review language in Cage and Yates, and reaffirm the standard set out in 
Boyde." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4 (1991). 
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Here, Mark's jury was instructed that to find him guilty of the Bravences' first 
degree murders, the jury had to find he was a principal to or aided and abetted in the 
commission of a robbery during which Robert and Cheryl were killed. (Jury Instruction 
("JI") 11,10 pp.25-26; Tr., p.1802, Ls.2-21.) The jury was also instructed that it had to 
find Mark "intended to commit the act of robbery against the persons of Robert and/or 
Cheryl Bravence; [ and] Mark Lankford formed the intent to commit the act of robbery 
prior to the commission of the homicide(s)." (JI 12, p.26 (emphasis added); Tr., p.1802, 
L.22 - p.1803, L. 7.) Another instruction informed jurors that the term "perpetrate" means 
to do or to perfotm or commit an act. 
Idaho law provides that any murder committed in the perpetration or 
attempt to perpetrate a robbery constitutes a murder in the first degree. 
Perpetration of a robbery includes that period of time that is incident to 
or associated with the commission of robbery. When considering 
whether a killing occurred during the perpetration of or attempt to 
perpetrate a robbery, Idaho law extends the time frame to any death 
occurring during the stream of events constituting the Robbery. 
(JI 15, p.29 (emphasis added); Tr., p.1804, Ls.6-17.) 
Definition of the term "perpetrate" was important to the first degree murder 
charge because jurors were also instructed that 
[a]ny murder committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a 
robbery is murder in the first degree. You are instructed that if you find 
that Cheryl Bravence and Robert Bravence were killed during the 
perpetration of or an attempt to perpetrate a robbery, then the State need 
not prove that the killing was an intentional killing as an element of first 
degree murder because a defendant who participates in a robbery can be 
held liable for the death of any person killed during the commission of 
that felony regardless of the defendant's intent that a death occur. 
10 The Jury Instructions were made part of the appellate record through a motion and 
order to augment, and are cited herein by the instruction number and page number. 
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(I.I. 16, p.30 (emphasis added); Tr., p.1804, L.18 p.1805, L.4.) Jurors were then 
instructed that 
[t]he law makes no distinction between a person who directly participates 
in the acts constituting a crime and the person who, either before or 
during its commission, intentionally aids, assists, facilitates, promotes, 
encourages, counsels, solicits, invites, helps or hires another to commit a 
crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission. 
(JI 18, p.32 ( emphasis added).) Jurors were then instructed that 
[ a]ll persons who participate in a crime either before or during its 
commission, by intentionally aiding, abetting, advising, hiring, counseling, 
procuring another to commit the crime with intent to promote or assist in 
its commissions are guilty of the crime. All such participants are 
considered principals in the commission of the crime. 
(JI 19, p.33 ( emphasis added).) 
Finally, jurors were instructed that to find Mark guilty of robbery, the State had to 
prove that he took personal property from the person or immediate possession of Robert 
and/or Cheryl; he did so against their will; he did so by the intentional use of force, or 
fear, to overcome Robert's and/or Cheryl's will; and he did so with the intent to 
permanently deprive both or either of the Bravences of the property. 11 (JI 13, p.27; 
Tr., p.1803, Ls.7-21.) 
In closing argument, the prosecutor told jurors the State did not have to show 
Mark "killed anybody. We only have to show and I submit I think he did kill these 
victims. But we don't have to show that. We merely have to show that he participated in 
11 Permanent deprivation is not an element of robbery. See I.C. § 18-6501 (defining 
robbery as the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his 
person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or 
fear). 
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a robbery, and during that robbery somebody was killed." (Tr., p.1827, L.20 -- p.1828, 
L. l (emphasis added).) The prosecutor told jurors the robbery began when Mark and 
Bryan were at the McAlister campground and ended in Los Angeles, when the brothers 
abandoned the Bravences' van. (Tr., p.1830, L.22 p.1831, L.15.) In front ofthejury, the 
Court interrupted the prosecutor and stated, "That's not the law. The law is when the 
robbery ends. It has to be in Idaho .... It has to be in Idaho. It has to end in Idaho." 
(Tr., p.1831, Ls.16-22.) Following the Court's correction, the prosecutor told jurors that 
the "robbery certainly at the very least doesn't end until the bodies are disposed of" 
(Tr., p.1831, Ls.24-25 ( emphasis added).) The Court then infom1ed the jurors, "I'm 
going to instruct you that the robbery ends when they take permanent possession of the 
items that have been robbed." (Tr., p.1832, Ls.10-13.) Based on this definition from the 
Court, the prosecutor argued that the evidence clearly showed that with respect to the 
murder, Mark participated in that portion of the crime: 
And again instruction 16 talks about the intentional killing as an element 
of first degree murder which we don't have to prove. We don't have to 
prove who actually killed the Bravences, just that there was a robbery and 
that Mark Lankford participated in that robbery and that there was a 
killing. And really even under Mark Lankford 's testimony, he participated 
in the robbery. He testified that he helped load those bodies into the van. 
I submit that that is participating in the robbery. And he either was a 
direct participant or aided and abetted in that. 
(Tr., p.1832, L.23 p.1833, L.8 ( emphasis added).) The prosecutor emphasized this point 
agam: 
And the corroborating evidence need only be slight, it just needs to tend to 
connect the defendant to the commission of the robbery. And we have 
overwhelming evidence in regards to that: The helping with the bodies, 
with the driving away, with the bodies 31 miles up into the mountains and 
burying those bodies. 
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(Tr., p.1833, Ls.18-24.) The district court did not intervene to correct the prosecutor's 
statement of the law, as it had with regard to the prosecutor's other erroneous statements, 
leaving jurors with the incorrect impression that the prosecutor's statements were 
accurate. 
This Court has held that to be liable for felony murder, an actor must fonn the 
intent to commit the underlying felony prior to the homicide. State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 
140, 150 (2010); State v. Cheatham, 134 Idaho 565, 571 (2000). "The general rationale 
behind the felony murder rule is that the intent to commit the felony substitutes for the 
malice requirement. Where the intent to commit the felony does arise until after the 
homicide has occurred, the rationale behind the rule no longer applies." Cheatham, 134 
Idaho at 571 ( citation omitted) ( emphasis added). 
Here, two different theories were presented to the jury regarding the robbery and 
homicide. Under one theory, Mark and Bryan formed the intent to steal the Bravences' 
van (commit robbery) prior to the homicides, rendering them both liable for the 
homicides, regardless of who inflicted the fatal blows. Under the other, Bryan formed the 
intent to steal the Bravences' van ( commit robbery) prior to killing Cheryl and Robert, 
and after he had completed the murders, Mark helped him conceal the bodies and 
benefited from the robbery by riding in the van, staying in hotel rooms and purchasing 
food and other items that were paid for with the Bravences' credit cards. Under the latter 
theory, Mark's involvement should have qualified him for a theft-related offense under 
Idaho Code section 18-2403, 12 or as an accessory after the fact, not a principal. See and 
compare I.C. § 18-205 (defining accessories) with I.C. § 18-204 (defining principals). 
12 The State did not charge Mark with a theft-related offense. 
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The instructions provided to the jury failed to explain different legal standards 
that applied, depending upon which version of events jurors believed to be true. Given 
the instructions, regardless of whether jurors believed the State's story, or Mark's 
testimony, the jury had to find Mark guilty of two counts of first degree murder beyond a 
reasonable doubt If the jury believed Mark's testimony, the instructions by the district 
court, coupled with the prosecutor's closing arguments that the perpetration of the 
robbery continued through the concealment of the bodies, relieved the State of its burden 
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Mark formed the intent to commit the robbery 
before it happened, rendering him guilty of felony murder even though the State did not 
prove all of the elements of felony murder. This permitted the State to gain two felony 
murder convictions based on Mark's involvement in a theft after the Bravences were 
killed. 
The instructional error was fundamental, depriving Mark of his constitutional 
right to due process and a fair trial by relieving the State of its burden of proving him 
guilty of every element of first degree felony murder before gaining a conviction. The 
error is plain on the record, without the need for additional information or evidence, and 
because it relieved the State of its burden of proof on every element of the offense of first 
degree felony murder, the error is not harmless. Accordingly, Mark's convictions must 
be vacated and his case remanded for trial before a properly instructed jury. 
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II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S INSTRUCTION ADVISING JlJRORS OF MARK'S 
PRIOR CHARGES, CONVICTIONS AND APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS FOR THE 
SAME OFFENSES IN THIS CASE VIOLA TED HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL JURY 
A. Introduction 
The district court told jurors during voir dire that Mark had previously been tried 
and convicted of the charged crimes in 1984, and because an appellate court found that he 
was not effectively represented at his prior trial, his case was now before them (in 2008) 
for a new trial. Trial counsel did not object to the district comi's instruction, but because 
the instruction deprived Mark of his constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial 
jury, his convictions must be vacated and his case remanded for a new trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because trial counsel did not object to the district court's instruction advising 
jurors of Mark's prior trial, conviction and appellate proceedings, Mark must demonstrate 
to this Court that the error is fundamental. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588 (2011). 
An error is fundamental if it: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists in the record; and (3) was not harmless. State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010). An error is not harmless if there is a reasonable 
possibility that it affected the outcome. Id. "Placing the burden of demonstrating harm on 
the defendant will encourage the making of timely objections that could result in the error 
being prevented or the harm being alleviated." Id. 
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The District Court's Admission Of Evidence Of Mark's Prior Trial And 
Convictions For The Charged Offenses Violated Mark's Constitutional Right To 
Fair Trial Before An Impartial Jury 
Without objection from defense counsel, and without warning, at the beginning of 
voir dire, the district court told the potential jury panel about Mark's prior charges, trial, 
conviction and appeal: 
Ladies and gentlemen, I'm going to tell you now that you are no doubt 
wondering why Mr. Lankford is being tried now for an offense that 
occurred in 1983. There was a prior trial in Idaho County in 1984 for the 
offenses for which he is now charged. And an Appeals Court held that 
Mr. Lankford was not effectively represented and that his trial was 
therefore unfair. As jurors you are not to consider the earlier trial and 
deliberate whether or not Mr. Laknford is guilty. In other words, you must 
presume him to be innocent and judge the charges against him solely on 
the evidence that is presented during this trial considering in any 
manner his earlier trial. 
(1/28/08 Voir Dire Tr., p.115, Ls.6-18.) 
The due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions guarantee an 
accused the right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; 
Idaho Const. art 1, sections 7, 13; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968); State 
v. Nadlman, 63 Idaho 153, 118 P.2d 58, 61-62 (1941). This Court has long recognized 
that an accused's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury on a substantive offense can 
be compromised when a jury is made aware of an accused's prior convictions. 
For example, in cases where the State alleges the defendant is subject to 
punishment as a persistent violator due to prior convictions, or is subject to substantially 
greater punishment due to prior convictions for similar conduct, this Court has held jurors 
cannot be told of or presented with evidence of the prior convictions unless the defendant 
is first found guilty of the substantive offense. State v. Wiggins, 96 Idaho 766, 768 (1975) 
(felony DUI based on defendant's prior DUis); State v. Johnson, 86 Idaho 51, 61 (1963) 
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(persistent violator based on prior convictions). In such cases, the trial is bifurcated with 
the substantive offense tried first, and then if a defendant is found guilty, the State can 
then present evidence of the prior convictions. Wiggins, 96 Idaho at 768; Johnson, 86 
Idaho at 61. This bifurcated procedure recognizes a defendant's right to a fair and 
impartial trial may be compromised if evidence of a defendant's prior convictions is 
allowed during the trial of the substantive offense. Id. This procedure also recognizes 
jurors' exposure to evidence of a defendant's prior convictions is so prejudicial and 
damning, that it cannot be erased or cured by a limiting instruction. Wiggins, 96 Idaho at 
768; Johnson, 86 Idaho at 61-62. 
The United States Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Leonard v. 
United States, 378 U.S. 544, 544-45 (1964) (per curiam), where it held that when a 
prospective jury panel heard the trial court announce a guilty verdict against the 
defendant for forgery-related offenses, and the jury for the defendant's second forgery-
related case was selected from that prospective panel, the guilty verdict in the second 
case could not stand. 
Even more prejudicial than jurors' knowledge of a defendant's prior convictions 
for unrelated crimes is jurors' knowledge that a defendant has previously been found 
guilty of the same crime which is the subject of the trial. Indeed, the Fifth Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals concluded "we are hard pressed to think of anything more damning to 
an accused than information a jury had previously convicted him for the crime charged." 
United States v. Williams, 568 F.2d 464, 470-71 (5 th Cir. 1978) (two jurors' exposure to 
information about defendants' convictions at first trial resulted in an unfair second trial, 
even though the two jurors said they could disregard the information and decide the case 
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solely on evidence adduced in court). In a case nearly directly on point with the facts in 
Mark's case, the Fourth Circuit deemed a court's instruction advising jurors of the 
defendant's prior conviction in the same case, to be prejudicial error requiring a new trial: 
We find the error in this case of allowing the jury to receive as its 
first impression in the case the admitted fact that the defendant had already 
been convicted of the same crime and that the present jury was to retry the 
defendant only because the prior conviction was reversed on procedural 
grounds cannot be considered harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt as 
required by Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967)], even 
though the evidence of guilt was great and the defense of insanity tenuous. 
When the jury heard the judge's instruction, approved by defense counsel, 
[the defendant's] chances for a fair trial by an impartial jury were 
seriously and irreparably prejudiced. 
Arthurv. Bordenkircher, 715 F.2d 118, 120 (4th Cir. 1983). 
There is a reasonable possibility the district court's instruction informing jurors 
Mark had already been convicted of the precise charges before them, but had gained a 
new trial because of a procedural defect in his first trial--not because he was not guilty-
affected the jury's verdict in this case. Because the harm stemming from this type of 
instruction cannot be cured or minimized by a contemporaneous limiting instruction, and 
the error undermined Mark's constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial jury, 
the error is fundamental. The error is plain and obvious from the record and because the 
error could not have been and was not cured by the limiting instruction, any 
contemporaneous objection could not have mitigated the harm stemming from the 
Court's instruction. The error was not harmless, because once the jury was advised Mark 
had already been convicted of the charged offenses, his chances for a fair trial before an 
impartial jury were seriously and irreparably prejudiced. Thus, the district court's 
advisement to the jury regarding Mark's prior charges, conviction and successful appeal 
on procedural grounds, is fundamental error entitling Mark to a new trial. 
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III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED MARK'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON THE COURT'S VIOLATIONS OF 
IDAHO CODE SECTION 19-2405 
A Introduction 
Mark filed a motion for a new trial, arguing the jury was misdirected in a matter of 
law, and the verdict was contrary to the law and evidence. (R., pp.441-42.) He then filed 
two memoranda in support of his motion, maintaining the district court violated [daho 
Code section 19-2405, by allowing the State to rely on prior trial testimony of witnesses 
who were unavailable, and by telling jurors about Mark's prior trial, conviction, 
incarceration on death row and his subsequent successful appeal. (6/15/09 and 7/29/09 
Defendant's Memorandum and Amended Memorandum in Support of Motion for New 
Trial.) After receiving briefing and hearing argument, the district court denied the 
motion, concluding there was no legal basis for a new trial, the admission of prior witness 
testimony did not violate Mark's right of confrontation or the statute, and Mark was not 
prejudiced when the Court advised jurors of his prior trial, particularly in light of the 
Court's limiting instruction. (Supp. R., pp.49-50, 53-63.) 
B. Standard Of Review 
This Court reviews a district court's denial or grant of a motion for new trial for 
an abuse of discretion. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144 (2008). Whether a district 
court abused its discretion turns on three factors: (1) whether the district court correctly 
perceived its decision as discretionary; (2) whether the district court acted within the 
boundaries of that discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards; and (3) 
whether the district court reaches its decision through an exercise of reason. State v. 
Ellington, 157 Idaho 480,485 (2014) (citations omitted). 
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An abuse of discretion will not be found unless the trial court granted a 
new trial for a reason not specified in section 19-2406, or unless the 
decision was "manifestly contrary to the interests of justice." That 
discretion generally is not abused unless a new trial is granted for a reason 
that is not delineated in Idaho Code § 19--2406 or the decision to grant or 
deny a new trial is contrary to the interest of justice. Bolen, 143 Idaho at 
439, 146 P.3d at 705. Where a new trial is sought on an assertion of trial 
court error in admitting or excluding evidence, if error has occurred the 
issue becomes whether the incorrect evidentiary ruling was hannlcss or 
reversible error. State v. Roberts, 129 Idaho 194, 198, 923 P.2d 439, 443 
(1996); State v. Howell, 137 Idaho 817, 820, 54 P.3d 460, 463 
(Ct.App.2002). A trial error will be deemed harmless if the appellate court 
can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury's verdict would 
have been the same absent the error. State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 821, 
965 P.2d 174, 181 (1998); Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 925, 877 P.2d 
365, 369 (1994). 
State v. Critchfield, 153 Idaho 680, 683 (Ct. App. 2012). 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mark's Motion For A New 
Trial Based On Violations ofldaho Code Section 19-2405 
Mark moved for a new trial based on violations of Idaho Code section 19-2405. 
Specifically, Mark argued that the statute was violated when the district court allowed the 
State to present prior sworn testimony at his trial, and when the district court informed 
jurors of Mark's prior trial, conviction and appeals for the same offenses. (7 /29/09 
Amended Memorandum.) 
Idaho Code section 19-2406 sets forth the exclusive grounds upon which a district 
court may grant a new trial. State v. Roberts, 129 Idaho 194, 197 (1996). Those grounds 
include errors by the district court which misdirect the jury in a matter of law, and errors 
by the district court in deciding any question of law, which includes evidentiary rulings. 
Id.; LC. § 19-2406(5). Here, the district court misdirected the jury and erred when it 
granted the State's pretrial evidentiary request to present prior transcript testimony of 
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witnesses who were no longer available, and when it advised the jury of Mark's prior 
conviction for the charged offenses and his subsequent successful appeal. 13 
Idaho Code section 19-2405 is titled "Effect of new trial" and its terms are plain 
and unambiguous. "The granting of a new trial places the parties in the same position as 
if no trial had been had. All the testimony must be produced anew, and the former verdict 
can not be used or referred to either in evidence or in argument." Id. ( emphasis added). 14 
Pursuant to the plain language of this provision, testimony elicited at former trial cannot 
be admitted at a new trial, but must be presented anew through live witnesses, and 
evidence or argument relating to a former verdict cannot he used or referenced at the new 
trial. As the statute states, its purpose is to put the parties in the same position they would 
have been in had there been no prior trial. The Court violated the explicit, plain language 
of section 19-2405 by allowing the State to submit testimony from the first trial in the 
second trial through transcripts rather than live witnesses, and by advising jurors of 
13 In its Order denying Mark's motion for a new trial, the district court judge maintained 
its belief that it had issued a pretrial ruling about advising Mark's new jury of the prior 
trial for the same charges, but could not locate its decision. (Supp. R., pp.53-54 & n. l.) 
While discussion of this issue can be found throughout the pretrial proceedings, 
undersigned counsel can locate no final decision from the trial court on this matter, other 
than the trial judge's conclusion that this evidence should not be admitted at the new trial. 
Even assuming the judge is correct and he made a later contrary ruling, that ruling is not 
part of the record. This Court has repeatedly recognized that a court speaks only through 
its records, and the judge speaks only through the court. State v. Aguilar, 103 Idaho 578, 
591 (1982). 
14 This provision has been in effect since 1864. The only difference between the 1864 
version and the current version is that the 1864 included the following sentence: "A new 
trial is a re-examination of the issue, in the same court, before another jury, after a verdict 
has been given." Laws of Idaho, Criminal Practice Act, § 426. By the time the revised 
states were issued in 1887, this sentence had been removed from the statute. Rev. St. 
Idaho, Chapter VI, § 7951 (1887). The 1887 statute is identical to the current version of 
Idaho Code section 19-2405. 
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Mark's prior trial, convictions and appeals for the same offense. Each violation will be 
addressed separately. 
1. Prior Testimony Of Witnesses 
The State moved the district court for an order allowing it to offer the testimony 
of witnesses who testified against Mark at the first trial, but who had since died and thus 
were unavailable, through the reading of their prior transcript testimony to the jury. 
(12/13/07 Hrg. Tr., p.76, L.11 p.83, L.21.) The defense argued that in light of Idaho 
Code section 19-2405, which requires the State produce all testimony anew, the prior 
testimony was inadmissible. (12/13/07 Hrg. Tr., p.83, L.23 - p.87, L.23.) The Court 
granted the State's motion and allowed the prior testimony to be admitted. (12/13/07 Hrg. 
Tr., p.89, L.21 p.90, L.4, 12/27/07 Hrg. Tr., p.148, L.20 p.149, L.3.) 
Over counsels' objection, the Court allowed the State to present the prior trial 
testimony of Gilda Howard, Roy Ralmuto, Ned Stuart, Art Goodloe, Ernie Wells and 
Donald Lazarrini, by having their prior testimony read to the jury by third parties. 
(R., pp.66-64, 99.) Before the testimony of Gilda Howard was read to the jury, the Court 
advised jurors that the witness was now deceased and the testimony would be read by an 
impartial person. (Tr., p.353, Ls.6-11.) 
Gilda Howard was Robert Bravence's mother and in her testimony, she identified 
Robert's Volkswagon van, his dog Phantom, credit card statements and receipts for 
expenses and purchases incurred after the Bravences' deaths, and a camera owned by 
Robert prior to his death. (Tr., p.353, L.4 - p.375, L.13.) Art Goodloe was a foreman for 
the State Highway Department in June of 1983 and was assigned to the county line south 
and to Elk City, and then half-way to Cottonwood. (Tr., p.545, L.12 - p.547, L.14.) 
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Through his prior testimony, he said he saw a greenish Volkswagon van at the Santiam 
Creek on the morning of June 21, at about 9:30 or 10 a.m. (Tr., p.547, Ls.17-24.) He saw 
two people, a man and a woman, walking around with their dog, a black and white dog 
with a curled tail. (Tr., p.548, L. 10 p.550, L. 1.) He passed back by the area about 3 or 
3:30 in the afternoon and saw the van parked at a flat--referred to as Sheep Creek--just 
below Castle Creek and saw the dog again. (Tr., p.550, Ls.4-18, p.559, Ls.6-24.) He 
noticed the van had a Texas license plate and identified a picture of the Bravences' van 
and their dog Phantom as the same ones he had seen that day. (Tr., p.551, L.15 p.552, 
L.24.) 
Ernest Wells worked for the forest service m June of 2008, maintaining 
campgrounds and collecting money in the Southfork River area, including the McAlister 
campground and the Sheep Creek areas. (Tr., p.590, L. I p.594, L. 11.) He testified about 
a tree planter who found a dog identified as Phantom by its tag in Sheep Creek camp area 
who stopped him and asked him what to do with the dog; Mr. Wells also described the 
layout of the McAlister campground and the Sheep Creek camp area. (Tr., p.594, L.6 -
p.622, L.2.) Donald Lazzarini was a telephone company supervisor in Grangeville who 
testified that a specific phone number was associated with a specific phone booth in 
Grangeville on June 21, 1983. (Tr., p.726, L.3 -p.728, L.9.) 
Roy Ralmuto was a friend of the Lankford family from Texas. (Tr., p.900, L.1 -
p.901, L.4.) He testified about Mark and Bryan's occupations, Mark's Z28, and getting a 
collect call at the end of June, beginning of July 1983 from Bryan. (Tr., p.903, L.22 
p.906, L.21.) Mr. Ralmuto also testified about buying two bus tickets from Los Angeles 
to San Antonio for Mark and Bryan, picking them up at the bus station, them staying at 
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his home for a month and a half, and him dropping them off at the Trinity River. 
(Tr., p.907, L.3 p.909, L.15.) When they parted ways, Roy testified Mark shook his 
hand and told him he would never see him (Mark) alive again, but he may sec Bryan. 
(Tr., p.911, Ls.3-20.) He also testified Mark and Bryan left his house because they 
noticed Department of Public Safety (DPS) cars were parked outside Mr. Ralmuto's 
home and Mark responding that they had to get out of there now because DPS was there 
looking for Bryan. (Tr., p.912, L.4 -- p.913, L.19.) Mr. Ralmuto confirmed Bryan left 
Texas because he was on probation for robbery, had violated that probation and was told 
by his probation officer he would be going to prison. (Tr., p.914, Ls.11-24.) Mr. Ralmuto 
admitted being closer to Bryan than Mark. (Tr., p.914, Ls.3-10.) Mr. Ralmuto purchased 
the bus tickets in the name of Bob and Mike Lankford due to the fact there might be a 
warrant for Bryan's arrest in Texas. (Tr., p.920, Ls.3-14.) 
Ned Stuart was the director of the North Idaho College Crime Lab and 
coordinator for the school of law enforcement. (Tr., p.1490, L.4 p.1491, L.24.) At the 
request of the Idaho County Sheriffs Office, he compared Bryan's known fingerprint 
against a fingerprint found on the receipt from the Oregon motel where Bryan and Mark 
stayed on June 22, 1983, and determined they were a match. (Tr., p.1493, L.13 - p.1495, 
L.18.) 
The State recalled Ms. Howard, again by transcript, whose testimony that Robert 
Bravence's last Master Card credit card bill was $2,876.62, and only two of the 
purchases, one for $19.38 and one for $126, were made prior to his death on June 21, 
1983, was read to the jury. (Tr., p.1495, L.19 p.1499, L.l.) 
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The district court's decision to admit all of this testimony by reading of transcripts 
violated Idaho Code section 19-2405. The statute codifies the legislature's intent that a 
person who receives a new trial should not be prejudiced by the fact that a prior trial 
occurred, but should get the benefit of a new trial, including the State's presentation of 
live testimony. The statute provides defendants with a substantive right to a new trial 
before a fact finder who is not tainted or influenced by exposure to the fact or the prior 
proceeding, either by direct reference to the prior trial and conviction, or indirectly 
through the introduction of testimony offered at the prior triaL 15 Moreover, the absence of 
live testimony deprived jurors of "the opportunity to observe witnesses' demeanor, to 
assess their credibility, to detect prejudice or motive, and to judge the character of the 
parties." In re Doe, 156 Idaho 682, 687 (2014). 
Appellate courts in states with similar statutes have reached differing results when 
interpreting their statutes. In Montana, the statute provides that "[t]he granting of a new 
trial places the parties in the same position as if there had been no trial." Mont. Code 
Ann. § 46-16-701. Interpreting this language, the Montana Supreme Court held the 
statute did not prevent the State from introducing the defendant's testimony from the first 
trial at his new trial. State ex rel. Mazurek v. District Court of Twentieth Judicial Dist., 22 
P.3d 166, 169 (Mont.2000). In reaching its conclusion, the Court cited to the version of 
statute in effect from 1895 to 1967, which provided: 
The granting of a new trial places the parties in the same position as if no 
trial had been had. All the testimony must be produced anew, and the 
former verdict cannot be used or referred to either in evidence or in 
argument, or be pleaded in bar of any conviction which might have been 
had under the indictment or information. 
15 See State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 974-75 (2008) (holding if there is a conflict 
between a statute and court rule, the statute prevails as to matters of substance). 
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~Mazurek, 22 P.3d at 169 (quoting 2191, R.C.M. (1985)), When the legislature amended 
the statute in 1967, it deleted the phrase "all testimony must be produced anew." !cl. In 
light of the 1967 amendment, the Montana Supreme Court held: 
prior to 1967, the predecessor to [Montana Code Ann. § 46-16-701], 
expressly provided that testimony must be produced anew in a new trial. 
The corollary to that express provision, of course, was that testimony from 
an earlier trial could not be used in a new trial of the same case. In 
revising the criminal procedure code, however, the Legislature amended 
the statute by deleting the language requiring that testimony be produced 
anew. 
[t has long been the law that, when the Legislature amends a statute, we 
will presume that it meant to make some change in the existing law. 
Consequently, we presume that the Legislature, through its 1967 
amendment, intended to change the existing law and allow the use of 
testimony from a prior trial in a new trial. Furthermore, as the pertinent 
portion of the statute has not changed substantively since 1967, we 
conclude that § 46-16--701, MCA, continues to reflect this intent. 
Therefore, we conclude that § 46-16--701, MCA, does not preclude the 
State from using [ the defendant's] testimony from the first trial during its 
case-in-chief at the retrial of this case and the District Court's conclusion 
to the contrary is erroneous. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Montana's statute, prior to the 1967 amendment, 
was identical to Idaho's section 19-2405 with respect to prior testimony; the Montana 
Supreme Court's opinion makes it clear that the language of the statute prior to 1967 
would have precluded the admission of prior testimony at a new trial. Id. 
In Oklahoma, the statute explaining the effect of a new trial is similar to Idaho's 
except that with respect to testimony, it explicitly provides: "[a]ll the testimony must be 
produced anew except of witnesses who are absent from the state or dead, in which event 
the evidence of such witnesses on the former trial may be presented[.]" 22 Okl. St. 
Ann.§ 951 (A) (emphasis added). Idaho's statute contains no explicit exception for prior 
testimony. 
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Finally, California's new trial statute provides, in relevant part, that the grant of a 
"new trial places the parties in the same position as if no trial had been had. All the 
testimony must be produced anew[.]" West's Ann. Calif Penal Code § 1180. The 
California Supreme Court first interpreted this provision in 1873 and concluded that "[ t Jo 
prove what a witness swore to on a former trial is producing the testimony anew, and is 
not using or referring to the former verdict in any sense." People v. Devine, 46 Cal. 45, 
48 (1873). The Court's opinion is limited in length and short on analysis, with no real 
explanation of the basis for its decision admitting the prior sworn testimony at a new trial, 
contrary to plain language of the statute. Undersigned counsel can find no California 
decisions analyzing this issue since 1873. 
As previously noted, section 19-2405 has been in effect since 1864, prior to the 
California Supreme Court's decision in Devine. The only difference between the 1864 
version and the current version is that the 1864 version included the following sentence: 
"A new trial is a re-examination of the issue, in the same court, before another jury, after 
a verdict has been given." Laws of Idaho, Criminal Practice Act, § 426. By the time the 
revised states were issued in 1887, this sentence had been removed. Rev. St. Idaho, 
Chapter VI, § 7951 (1887). The 1887 statute is identical to the current version of Idaho 
Code section 19-2405. Accordingly, the interpretation of this statute by the California 
Supreme Court in 1873 cannot be said to have influenced the intent of legislators who 
crafted this provision in 1863 or 1864. 
Mark maintains that without an explicit exception, Idaho Code section 19-2405 
prohibits the admission of prior testimony in a new trial, much like the Montana Supreme 
Court held in Mazurek, 22 P .3d at 169. The district court's refusal to abide by the plain 
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language of the statute, despite repeated requests, entitles Mark to a new trial where the 
State must present live witness testimony rather than reading prior testimony into the 
record from transcripts. The error was not harmless, as it compounded the trial com1's 
instrnction telling jurors that Mark had previously been tried and convicted for the same 
crimes, but had been granted a new trial because an appellate court found he was not 
adequately represented by counsel. The prejudice flowing from this error is explained 
above, see Issue II(C), and is incorporated here by reference. 
2. References To The Prior Trial, Conviction And Appeals 
In denying Mark's motion for a new trial, the trial court concluded that its 
comments regarding Mark's prior charges, trial and appeals, did not tell jurors anything 
they did not already know or assume, given the passage of time between the offense and 
trial, especially where a substantial portion of the testimony offered by the State had 
originally been presented decades before. 16 (Supp. R., pp.59-61.) The district court also 
concluded Mark was not prejudiced by the Court's comments regarding the prior trial and 
conviction, because the Court advised jurors they could not consider the prior trial in 
determining Mark's guilt, and the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. (Supp. R., p.61.) 
The district court's decision to advise jurors of the prior proceedings was contrary 
to existing legal standards and outside the bounds of its discretion. Section 19-2405 is 
unambiguous and contains no exceptions to its explicit terms. Whether jurors would be 
curious about the time lapse between the offense and trial is irrelevant; satiating jurors' 
curiosity is not a basis upon which to make evidentiary rulings. If that were the case, 
16 This is further support for the reason why the trial court should not have permitted the 
State to introduce witness testimony through any means except live testimony. 
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comis would routinely advise jurors why particular evidence would not be admitted, or 
why the court was sustaining an objection to the admission of particular evidence, and 
then tell jurors to disregard the infonnation. The point of section 19-2405 is to give a 
defendant an opportunity to have a fair trial, and to avoid the obvious prejudice that 
attaches to a prior conviction on the same facts for the same crime. A prior conviction 
that is vacated and results in a new trial is a conviction that is compromised and unfair for 
one reason or another, otherwise a new trial would not have been granted. Excluding 
evidence of the compromised prior trial and conviction from the knowledge and 
consideration of jurors at a new trial is necessary to avoid prejudice to the defendant. The 
district court's violation of the plain language of the statute to advise jurors that Mark had 
previously been, charged and convicted of the same offenses before them, but had been 
granted a new trial on appeal based on procedural grounds, constitutes an abuse of 
discretion because it is not consistent with legal standards and the decision to admit the 
testimony was not based on an exercise of reason. See Issue II(C), incorporated here by 




THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT DURING TRIAL BY 
ELICITfNG INADMISSIBLE PRIOR BAD ACT TESTIMONY FROM ITS 
WITNESSES, REFERENCING MARK'S PRIOR CONVICTION, DEATH SENTENCE 
AND TIME ON DEATH ROW, REPEATEDLY CALLING MARK A LIAR AND 
BOLSTERING ITS OWN WITNESSES CREDIBILITY IN CLOSING ARGUMENT, 
AND SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE OF DEALS IT MADE WITH SNITCHES IN 
EXCHANGE FOR THEIR TRIAL TESTIMONY 17 
A. Introduction 
Throughout the trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony from State witnesses 
claiming Mark had previously stolen cars, he had previously been to prison (prior to 
1983), that he had previously been convicted of the murders of the Bravences and 
sentenced to death for those crimes, and that he had spent more than twenty years on 
death row. In addition, during closing argument, the prosecutor repeatedly called Mark a 
liar, while extolling the virtues and credibility of its own witnesses. Although defense 
counsel did not object below to most of this misconduct, the misconduct violated Mark's 
constitutional right to a fair trial and affected his substantial rights, requiring this Comi to 
vacate his convictions and remand his case for a new trial. Finally, the State suppressed 
valuable Brady evidence relating to deals it made with snitches for the trial testimony, 
17 Mark raised these claims in his second motion for a new trial and properly identified 
the claims as involving the elicitation of false or perjured testimony and the suppression 
of favorable evidence. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding the 
suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process when 
the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, regardless of the good or bad faith 
of the prosecutor); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (holding prosecutor's 
elicitation of false or perjured testimony violated defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due 
process rights and where testimony may have an effect on the outcome of the trial, the 
conviction cannot stand). The district court addressed these issues under Brady and 
Napue, as part of its analysis of Mark's second motion for a new trial. (Supp. R., pp.897-
901, 905-12.) 
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and violated Napue by eliciting false or perjured testimony about the deals they made 
with the prosecutor in exchange for their testimony. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A conviction will be set aside for unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct only if 
the misconduct is sufficiently egregious to constitute fundamental error. State v. Parker, 
157 Idaho 132, 141 (2014). To prove an error is fundamental, a defendant bears the 
burden of proving: (1) the error violated one or more of his constitutional rights; (2) the 
error is obvious from the existing record; and (3) the errors affected the defendant's 
substantial rights. Id.; State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). If a defendant meets this 
burden, this Court applies the harmless error test to determine whether the defendant has 
shown there is a reasonable possibility the error affected the outcome of the trial. Id. ff 
so, the conviction is vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. Id. 
C. The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct During The Trial By Eliciting 
Inadmissible Prior Bad Act Testimony From Its Witnesses, Referencing Mark's 
Prior Conviction, Death Sentence And Time On Death Row, And In Closing 
Argument by Repeatedly Calling Mark A Liar And Bolstering Its Own 
Witnesses' Credibility In Closing Argument, And Suppressing Evidence Of Deals 
It Made With Snitches In Exchange For Their Trial Testimony 
The prosecutor's misconduct during Mark's trial, eliciting inadmissible prior bad 
act testimony and testimony about the prior trial, conviction, death sentence and Mark's 
time on death row, and his comments upon the credibility of his own witnesses while 
repeatedly calling Mark a liar in closing argument, constitutes fundamental error which 
deprived Mark of his constitutional right to fair trial; there is a reasonable possibility the 
misconduct affected the outcome of the trial and undermined confidence in the validity of 
the verdicts. 
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1. Prosecutorial Misconduct During Trial 
The record reflects defense counsel sought a pretrial order precluding the State 
and the Court from referencing Mark's prior trial, conviction, incarceration and appeals. 
At the hearing on the defense's motion, the State agreed, as did the trial court, that 
references to Mark's prior charges, conviction and incarceration were inadmissible. 
(12/13/07 Hrg. Tr., p.35, L.25 - p.38, L.15.) Although the State later changed its mind 
and sought an order allowing it to refer to Mark's prior charges, convictions, sentences 
and incarceration, it never asked for a final ruling from the trial court, and the order 
excluding such evidence is the only one in the record. (12/13/07 Tr., p. l 00, L.4 p. l 08, 
L.21, p.110, L.5 --p.113, L.11.) 
With respect to Mark's prior bad acts or prior convictions, the State moved for 
admission of Mark's prior burglary and accessory to auto theft convictions under Rule 
609 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. (R., pp.136-37.) The Court conditionally denied the 
State's request, indicating its inclination was to exclude the prior felonies due to age, but 
that it would reconsider the request once Mark testified. (1/10/08 Hrg. Tr., p.1285, L.25 
p.1287, L.15.) The State then moved to introduce Mark's prior bad acts, including his 
alleged admission to committing 18-19 burglaries in the 70s, but only if Mark testified 
and said he had never stolen anything before. Essentially, the State wanted to introduce 
the prior bad acts as character evidence but agreed it would not seek to admit the 
evidence in its case-in-chief. The Court reserved making a decision on the motion until 
Mark testified. (R., pp.317-18; 1/28/08 Tr., p.227, L.23 - p.229, L.12.) Ultimately, the 
Court refused to allow admission of Mark's prior convictions or alleged bad acts. 
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(Tr., p.1632, L.13 p.1640, L.50.) The prosecutor ignored these rulings and elicited 
inadmissible evidence from its witnesses during its case-in-chief. 
On direct examination, the State asked Lane Thomas if he had talked to Mark 
about his charges and what he was in for. Lane responded that Mark had told him "he's 
been on death row for 23 years for two murders, and that was committed in Grangeville." 
(Tr., p.1248, L.21 p.1249, L.3.) The prosecutor then elicited the following testimony 
from Bryan, again in its case in chief: 
• "So I was scared of prison because what Mark told me about prison, where 
he had been." (Tr., p.1276, Ls.9-11) 
• "[U]ltimately I agreed to help be a watchout because he [Mark] had stolen 
cars before and I had never stolen a car so" (Tr., p.1288, Ls.22-24) 
When asked if he ever talk to Mark about the various different statements Bryan made 
over time about the offense, and who committed it, Bryan testified he had: "We were on 
death row together for a long time." (Tr., p.1325, Ls.1-6.) Bryan also offered that Mark 
was friends with guards in the prison, and that the prison was run by gangs who do not 
like "rats, or snitches[,]" so his testimony against Mark put him at risk with prison gangs. 
(Tr., p.1323, Ls.3-10, p.1328, Ls.18-23.) The prosecutor then asked Bryan about prior 
testimony he had given in both Mark's prior trial, his own trial, and other hearings and 
appeals, again referencing the prior proceedings in Mark's case. (Tr., p.1328, L.24 -
p.1329, L.24.) 
The prosecutor's violations of the Court's pretrial orders18 were not objected to. 
Nevertheless, the prosecutor's elicitation of this testimony was part of its overarching 
18 It cannot be credibly claimed that the district court's instruction advising jurors that 
Mark had previously been tried and convicted for these offenses, but that an appeals court 
had determined his trial was not fair because he was not effectively represented (1/28/08 
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effort to paint Mark as a bad person, and thus arouse jurors' passions and prejudices 
against Mark to secure a conviction, rather than the evidence. "Where a prosecutor 
attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law set forth in the jury 
instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable inference that 
may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment 
right to a fair trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,227 (2010). 
The prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's repeated elicitation of inadmissible, 
prejudicial information reflecting Mark had previously been to prison, that he had 
previously stolen cars, that he had previously been tried, convicted and sentenced to 
death for the instant offenses and had been on death row for 23 years, could not have 
been remedied by an instruction from the Court advising jurors to disregard the evidence 
and comments. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003). Accordingly, the 
misconduct was not harmless, it constitutes fundamental error and entitles Mark to a new 
trial. 
2. Prosecutorial Misconduct In Closing Argument 
In closing argument, the State repeatedly called Mark a liar and told jurors Mark 
lied to them while testifying, and then vouched for the credibility of its own witnesses. 
Defense counsel did not object to any of the prosecutor's statements, including the 
following: 
• "Mark Lankford testified in this case, and there was [sic] many lies that he told you." 
(Tr., p.1815, Ls.18-19) 
• "[Mark] Lied to Darrel Cox about where he was going and who he was going to 
meet." (Tr., p.1815, Ls.21-22) 
• "It shows that he's a liar." (Tr., p.1816, L.4) 
Voir Dire Tr., p.115, Ls.6-12), opened the door for the State to admit evidence that had 
been deemed inadmissible. 
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• "You will see Mark Lankford is a liar." (Tr., p.1816, Ls.6-7) 
• "Darrel Cox had no reason to make that up. He had no reason to lie today. He was 
inconvenienced, I'm sure, to come in and be a witness in this case, but he told the 
truth." (Tr., p.1816, Ls. 7-10) 
• "Well, Mark lied. He said, I don't know anything about any murders, and I don't 
know anything about any stolen van. That was a lie." (Tr., p.1816, Ls.11-24) 
• "So he lied to you on the stand when he talked about the kind of money he had when 
he left Texas and when he came back from Texas." (Tr., p.1817, Ls.11-14) 
• "He lied to Robert Lankford about the money he had when he left Texas." 
(Tr., p.1817, Ls.2-3) 
• "He lied to Robert Lankford when he got back to Texas about why he left his car in 
Idaho." (Tr., p.1817, Ls.15-16) 
• "He lied about that. He lied about having money when he left and when he returned." 
(Tr., p.1817, Ls.22-24) 
• "He lied about going to the Frank Church River of No Return Wilderness." 
(Tr., p1818, Ls.l-2) 
• "He lied about having access to the hatchback door on the Camaro." (Tr., p.1818, 
Ls. l 0-11) 
e "Again, another lie." (Tr., p.1818, L.21) 
• "He lied about his use of the nightstick." (Tr., p.1818, L.22) 
• "But basically lied about the circumstances of that nightstick." (Tr., p.1819, L. l 03) 
• "He lied about having to use the restroom at McAlister." (Tr., p.1819, Ls.11-12) 
• "We've shown you good people that have come up and been honest." (Tr., p.1820, 
Ls.6-8) 
e "Lane Thomas, basically with his life on the line, came in and testified in front of 
you. He had no reason to lie. He did not get a plea bargain from the State. The only 
thing that we agreed to do was write a letter of cooperation that if he testified I would 
write a letter saying he came in and told the truth. And that I would send that to the 
Judge on his case and to the prison facility in Cottonwood where he's serving what 
they call a rider program." (Tr., p.1829, Ls.1-10) 
• "The overwhelming evidence is, one, the testimony of Lane Thomas that puts Mark 
Lankford there. A credible person that puts him there. Mark Lankford's confession to 
him." (Tr., p.1833, Ls.14-18) 
• "And the corroborating evidence need only be slight, it just needs to tend to connect 
the defendant to the commission of the robbery. And we have overwhelming 
evidence in regards to that: The helping with the bodies, with the driving away, with 
the bodies 31 miles up into the mountains and burying those bodies." (Tr., p.1833, 
Ls.18-24) 
• "I find it strange that these people he allegedly says gave him an alibi defense have 
never been found .... I submit that there is nobody that gave him a ride, and that 
that's a made-up story. That's another of his lies." (Tr., p.1835, Ls.11-16) 
• "I'd ask you think about Lane Thomas' testimony. I think we had a person there that 
didn't want to be here. He said - he said he didn't want to be here. He said that his 
life had been threatened by Mr. Lankford and that his life had been hell since he got 
involved in this case. Yet, even facing that he came in and testified for nothing, 
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nothing except a letter. And I submit he told the truth about Mark Lankford's 
confession to him, about him being there with Bryan Lankford and participating in 
these murders." (Tr., p.1839, Ls.9-18) 
The prosecutor's repeated references to Mark being a liar and its own witnesses 
being credible, particularly Lane who testified with his life on the line for nothing more 
than a letter, were improper comments intended to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse 
their passions or prejudice against Mark and determine guilt outside the evidence. State v. 
Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 369 (2013) (holding prosecutor cannot express personal belief 
regarding witness credibility in closing argument unless based solely on inferences from 
trial evidence); State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003) (holding it is improper in 
closing argument for prosecutor to express personal belief as to the credibility of 
witnesses, unless based solely on inferences from trial evidence, and even if comments 
arc objected to, appellate court can consider them if they constitute fundamental error). 
Even if the comments could be characterized as an analysis of the credibility of the 
evidence, the comments were nevertheless improper and the sheer volume renders them 
prejudicial and a violation of Mark's right to a fair trial. The prejudice resulting from the 
prosecutor's misconduct could not have been remedied by an instruction from the Court 
advising jurors to disregard the comments, in light of their volume. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 
at 280. Accordingly, the misconduct was not harmless, it constitutes fundamental error 
and entitles Mark to a new trial. 
3. Prosecutorial Misconduct In Rebuttal Closing Argument 
Prior to trial, the State and the defense were arguing about alibi evidence. The 
State wanted the defense to provide more specific information regarding Mark's alibi at 
the time of the Bravences' murders, and the Court had granted the State's request. 
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Defense counsel explained that he was having difficulty coming up with a more specific 
alibi regarding Mark's location at the time of the murders because he did not know 
precisely when the State was alleging the Bravences were killed. (1/10/08 Hrg. 
Tr., p.190, L.13 - p.192, L.16.) fn response, the State told the Court and defense counsel 
"And, Your Honor, we do know basically that the murders occurred around dark, around 
9:15, 9:00 in the evening." (1/10/08 Hrg. Tr., p.192, Ls.17-19.) The prosecutor then 
clarified the murders occurred on June 21, 1983, at about 9:15 p.m., just at dark. (Id., 
p.192, Ls.20-25.) In rebuttal closing argument, the State claimed the deaths occurred by 
8:30 p.m. on June 21, 1983, in an effort to undermine Mark's testimony about how the 
events of that evening unfolded, and to bolster Bryan's credibility. (Tr., p.1877, Ls.3-4, 
p.1878, Ls.16-17, p.1874, L.3 - p.1879, L.11, p.1882, Ls.5-9.) The defense objected and 
the Court overruled the objection, allowing the prosecutor to argue that the murder 
occurred at 8:30 p.rn. on June 21, 1983, rather than closer to 9:00 or 9:15 p.m., as it had 
agreed to pretrial. (Tr., p.1879, Ls.13-16.) 
The prosecutor's mischaracterization of the evidence and violation of its own 
stipulation was misconduct. State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 871 (2014). Because this 
misconduct was objected to by counsel, the State must prove it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007). The State relied upon this 
mischaracterization of the evidence of the time of the murders to support Bryan's 
testimony, which needed support given his credibility issue, by purporting to show 
Mark's testimony and timeline were impossible. This characterization could not have 
been made had the State adhered to its pretrial admission that the Bravences were killed 
sometime between 9:00 or 9:15 p.m. on June 21 st . Because Bryan and Mark were the only 
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people who testified as to the timcline of the offence, the timeline was critical to the jury 
deciding which version of events to credit. The prosecutor's misconduct in this regard 
was not harmless and prejudicial; Mark is entitled to a new trial as a result. 
4. Prosecutorial Misconduct For Brady And Napue Violations 
After trial, through independent investigation, Mark discovered the State had paid 
its informant, Lane Thomas, $1,500 after he testified against Mark. (8/5/14 E.H. 
Tr.,p.33, L.19-p.44, L.19, p.162, Ls.11-15, p.166, L.19-p.167, L.10, p.169, L.2 
p.175, L.19, p.249, L.11 p.251, L.19.) Mark also learned that Bryan had recanted his 
trial testimony, maintained he had been coerced to testify against Mark by State 
prosecutors, and asserted that his testimony, as well as that of Lane Thomas, had been 
coached by State prosecutors, who told them both what to say in their trial testimony. 
(Supp. R., pp.623-784.) Mark also discovered the State provided Bryan with a cell phone 
for the three to four months while he was in Idaho County Jail, so he could have direct 
and unlimited contact with his wife, which the State also failed to disclose. (Id.) Mark 
also discovered prosecutors intervened to get Lane out of prison at NICI long before he 
completed the rider program, but shortly after he testified, which was also undisclosed to 
the defense. (Id.) Mark argued this evidence showed the prosecution violated Brady by 
suppressing exculpatory evidence, and violated Napue by eliciting false or perjured 
testimony from Bryan and Lane regarding the deals they received in exchange for the 
trial testimony. (Supp. R., pp.623-787.) 
At its core, Napue protects a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due process 
rights by refusing to allow the State to benefit from a conviction gained through false or 
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perjured testimony, even if the State's only failure is one of omission in failing to correct 
testimony the prosecutor knows to be untrue. 
The principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence, including 
false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty, does not cease to apply merely because the false testimony 
goes only to the credibility of the witness .... "A lie is a lie, no matter 
what its subject, and, if it is in any way relevant to the case, the 
[prosecuting] attorney has the responsibility and duty to correct what he 
knows to be false and elicit the truth." 
Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-270 (quoting People v. Savvides, 136 N.E.2d 853, 854-56 (N.Y. 
1956)). 
This principle dates back to at least 1935, when the United States Supreme Comi 
considered what effect the State's elicitation of perjured testimony, coupled with its 
intentional suppression of impeachment evidence, should have on a State first degree 
murder conviction. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 ( 1935) (per curiam). In rejecting 
the State's argument that such conduct does not violate due process, and that a due process 
violation occurs only when a prosecutor's acts or omissions deprive a defendant of either 
notice or the opportunity to present evidence, the Court concluded that due process: 
is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and 
hearing if a state has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial 
which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty 
through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of 
testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a state to procure 
the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the 
rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by 
intimidation. And the action of prosecuting officers on behalf of the state, 
like that of administrative officers in the execution of its laws, may 
constitute state action within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
That amendment governs any action of a state, whether through its 
legislature, through its courts, or through its executive or administrative 
officers. 
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Id. at 112-13 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Thus, the Supreme Court has 
held the State violates a defendant's due process rights when it knowingly elicits false 
testimony, or allows false testimony to go uncorrected, and the testimony "had an effect 
on the outcome of the trial." Napue, 360 U.S. at 272. Under these circumstances, the 
conviction must be vacated and the defendant must receive a new trial. Giglio v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). 
Brady violations arc similar to Napue violations in that both involve conduct by 
the State that deprives a defendant of his right to a fair trial. Brady stands for the 
proposition that a State violates a defendant's due process rights when it suppresses 
evidence favorable to a defendant, where such evidence is material either to a defendant's 
guilt or punishment. Id. at 87. There are three components to a Brady violation: (1) the 
evidence must be favorable to the accused, which includes impeachment evidence 
relating to state witnesses; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the state, either 
intentionally or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have ensued. Stickler v. Greene, 
527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). 
Disputes involving Brady violations often center on the materiality of the 
evidence, not the failure to disclose, because if the evidence is not material, suppression 
does not violate due process. Id.; see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) 
(holding that evidence favorable to the defense for guilt or punishment purposes must be 
disclosed by the State, regardless of whether the defense asked for it, and the failure to do 
so will require a new trial if there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different); Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (holding that suppressed evidence must be considered 
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collectively, and the question is whether in the absence of the evidence, the defendant 
received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence; a 
reasonable probability of a different outcome is shown when the suppression of evidence 
undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial or proceeding). 
Favorable evidence includes evidence tending to exculpate the accused, evidence 
tending to reduce punishment, and any other evidence that adversely affects the 
credibility of the government's witnesses. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676; Giglio, 405 U.S. at 
154. Evidence is material "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Kyles, 
514 U.S. at 433. The "materiality" standard for establishing prejudice is the same as the 
prejudice standard under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Bagley, 473 
U.S. at 682. It is important to remember a "reasonable probability" is a burden less 
strenuous than a preponderance of the evidence, requiring a showing only that the 
suppressed evidence undermines confidence in the outcome, not that the outcome 
would have been different. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-35; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. 
[A] showing of materiality does not require demonstration by a 
preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have 
resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal (whether based on the 
presence of reasonable doubt or acceptance of an explanation for the crime 
that does not inculpate the defendant). Bagley's touchstone of materiality 
is a "reasonable probability" of a different result, and the adjective is 
important. The question is not whether the defendant would more likely 
than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether 
in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a 
verdict worthy of confidence. A "reasonable probability" of a different 
result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary 
suppression "undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial." 
The second aspect of Bagley materiality bearing emphasis here is that it is 
not a sufficiency of evidence test. A defendant need not demonstrate that 
after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed 
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evidence, there would not have been enough letl: to convict. The 
possibility of an acquittal on a criminal charge docs not imply an 
insufficient evidentiary basis to convict. One does not show a Brady 
violation by demonstrating that some of the inculpatory evidence should 
have been excluded, but by showing that the favorable evidence could 
reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to 
undermine confidence in the verdict. 
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434-35 (internal citations omitted). 
a. Lane Thomas's Undisclosed Deal With The State And False 
Testimony 
Lane Thomas testified for the State on Febmary 8, 2008. (Tr., p.1245, L. 10 
p.1270, L.6.) He said he was serving a six month term in the rider program at the North 
Idaho Correctional Institution (NICI) and was "pretty close" to being done with the 
program. (Tr., p.1246, Ls.4-15.) Notably, Mr. Thomas was released from the Latah 
County Jail and transferred to state custody to begin the six month program on 
December 26, 2007, so by the time he testified he had completed just over a month of his 
six month program. 19 (Tr., p.1241, Ls.3 -17.) Lane claimed Mark confessed to him that 
he and his brother Bryan killed two people in Grangeville, hitting them in the head with a 
shotgun first and then with a rock. (Tr., p.1249, L.12 -p.1251, L.20.) 
On direct examination, Lane first testified he received no plea bargain in 
exchange for testifying against Mark, and that the prosecutor's office was not doing 
19 Mr. Thomas was sentenced on December 14, 2007, to a unified three year sentence, 
with eighteen months fixed, but the district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days and 
set a review hearing for May 12, 2008, or upon completion of the program, whichever 
happened sooner. (Supp. R., pp.251-53 (Defendant's E.H. Ex. S).) The day Mark was 
convicted, Lane filed a Rule 35, supported by a letter from the prosecutor, Kirk 
MacGregor, asking the court to reconsider its retained jurisdiction order. (Supp. R., p.255 
(Defendant's E.H. Ex. S).) On February 29, 2008, the court suspended Lane's sentence, 
including the retained jurisdiction period, and placed him on probation. (Supp. 
R., pp.266-273 (Defendant's E.H. Ex. T).) 
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anything for him in exchange for his testimony. (Tr., p.1254, L.16 - p.1255, L.2.) At the 
prosecutor's urging, Lane admitted the prosecutor was writing a letter of cooperation to 
NICI, stating that Lane cooperated with the investigation of Mark's case and had 
"testified truthfully." (Tr., p.1257, Ls.12-22.) Lane testified aside from the letter of 
cooperation, he was testifying against Mark because he was 'just being honest." 
(Tr., p.1259, Ls.20-23.) 
Lane admitted to telling a different story than what he testified to in comi; 
specifically, Lane admitted he told his own lawyer he lied to detectives and the 
prosecutor but claimed it was because he had been threatened. (Tr., p.1257, L.23 --
p.1258, L.2L) Lane claimed Mark made a comment to him in jail that Lane was "a dead 
man walking," and if he ever repeated anything Mark said to him, Mark would make sure 
he was dead; Lane testified Mark said he had 23 years' worth of favors owed to him. 
(Tr., p.1258, L.22 - p.1259, L.4.) 
On cross-examination, Lane testified he wanted to better himself and be placed on 
probation at his rider review hearing; according to his own testimony, the rider was a six 
month program. (Tr., p.1260, L.4 - p.1261, L. l.) He affirmed it was his hope to be placed 
on probation "at the end of this [rider review]." (Tr., p.1261, Ls.2-4.) Lane admitted that 
in exchange for his testimony, he was given immunity and advised if he disavowed his 
prior statements, he would not be held accountable or prosecuted for perjury. 
(Tr., p.1262, Ls.14-22.) He claimed to have agreed to testify before the State offered him 
the letter of cooperation the night before he testified, and prior to that, the prosecutor 
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offered him nothing in exchange for his testimony. 20 (Tr., p, 1263, Ls. 9-17, p.1265, Ls.22-
24.) 
At the evidentiary hearing on the new trial, Mark's prosecutors, Dennis Albers 
and Kirk MacGregor, testified. (7/29/13 E.H. Tr., p.4, L.20 p.57, L.8, 8/5/13 - 8/6/13 
E.H. Tr., p.201, L.3 p.385, L.23.) Mr. Albers testified he and Mr. MacGregor went to 
Moscow after Christmas, but prior to trial, to talk to Latah County prosecutor Bill 
Thompson about Lane, and whether he would be "liberal" regarding the time Lane had to 
serve if Lane testified against Mark. (7/29/13 E.H. Tr., p.32, Ls.12-25, p.33, Ls.3-17.) 
Mr. MacGregor testified that he and Idaho County Detective Skott Mealer met with Lane 
prior to trial--in December or January--and Mr. MacGregor told Lane during that meeting 
that he would talk to Mr. Thompson and try to get him out of prison/the rider program at 
Cottonwood and on probation in Latah County if he testified "truthfully." (8/5/13 E.H. 
Tr., p.241, L.2 p.243, L.9.) 
Mr. MacGregor acknowledged contacting Mr. Thompson after the jury returned 
its verdict on February 13, 2008, finding Mark guilty of both counts of first degree 
murder. (8/6/13 E.H. Tr., p.334, L. 15 p.335, L.8; R., p.433.) He asked Mr. Thompson 
to keep Lane out of prison and place him on probation, and also wrote a letter to 
Mr. Thompson or Judge Stegner to that effect. (8/6/13 E.H. Tr., p.334, L.15 - p.335, L.8.) 
Mr. MacGregor acknowledged this information was not disclosed to defense counsel. 21 
20 This is untrue. Mr. MacGregor testified that he offered to try to get Lane put on 
probation when he met with Lane at Cottonwood in December 2007 or January of 2008, 
frior to trial. (8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p.240, L.24 - p.244, L.12.) 
1 See Supp. R., pp.704-07 (Defendant's E.H. Exs. A, B (affidavits of Charles Kovis and 
Jonathan Hallin that neither had any knowledge, at any time, of the county's $1,500 cash 
payment to Lane)). 
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Mr. Thompson recalled having an in-chambers meeting with Judge Stegner and 
Mr. Ramalingam, Lane Thomas's attorney, on February 13, 2008, about Lane's risks 
while on his rider, and an agreement being reached that Lane would be returned to Latah 
County early from his rider. (8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p.73, Ls.1-25.) Mr. Thompson testified that 
around the time of the rider review hearing on February 29, 2008, he recalled Mr. Albers 
and Mr. MacGregor were going to approach their county commissioners about giving 
$1,500 to Lane to help him relocate to Texas. (7/29/13 E.H. Tr., p.73, L.l -p.75, L.l.) 
While both Mr. MacGregor and Mr. Albers denied promising Lane money in 
exchange for his testimony, both admitted Idaho County paid Lane $1,500 on March 3, 
2008, when he was released from prison. The money was paid to Lane through a check 
written to Detective Mealer, who testified he cashed the check made out to him 
(Detective Mealer), and provided the cash proceeds to Lane behind a carwash. (8/5/14 
E.H. Tr., p.33, L.19 p. 44, L.19, p.162, Ls.11-15, p.166, L.19 p.167, L.10, p.169, L.2 
- p.175, L.19, p.249, L.11 p.251, L.19; Supp. R., pp.708-09, 758 (Defendant's E.H. 
Exs. D, DD).) 
Mr. Albers testified the $1,500 payment to Lane came up around the end of 
February or March 1, 2008, and it was not a deal with a defendant or witness he had ever 
made during his career as a prosecutor. (8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p.33, L.8 - p.36, L.25.) He did 
not remember who contacted him, if it was Detective Mealer or Mr. Ramalingam, or 
where the $1,500 amount came from, but Mr. Albers remembered talking to Idaho 
County Commissioner Randy Doman about the payment and telling him the check had to 
be made out to Skott Mealer, not Lane Thomas. (8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p.35, L. l - p.39, L.23.) 
Mr. Albers recalled an amorphous representation being made that the $1,500 was for 
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Lane's travel expenses out of Idaho, and recalled believing that amount was quite high, 
but he did not ask for or receive any documentation or proof that the $1,500 was being 
used for travel expenses and could not remember who made that representation. (8/5/13 
E.H. Tr., p.35, L. l -- p.43, L.19.) 
Mr. MacGregor testified he never disclosed the $1,500 payment to Mark's 
counsel and, contrary to Mr. Thompson's testimony, claimed he was unaware of the 
payment until he received Lane's bar complaint against him, which referenced the $1,500 
payment.22 (8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p.250, L.7 p.252, L.20, p.260, Ls.2-21, 8/6/13 E.H. 
Tr., p.337, Ls.4-14.) Mr. MacGregor testified he contacted Detective Mealer alter 
receiving the bar complaint and confirmed the $1,500 payment was made to Lane, but he 
did not receive that confirmation until sometime late in 20 l O or early 2011. (8/5/13 E.H. 
Tr., p.253, L.21 p.254, L.12, p.273, Ls.7-24, p.274 L.8-- p.277, L.16.) 
Mr. MacGregor admitted he intervened on Lane's behalf to keep Lane out of 
prison when Lane violated his probation in June of 2008, January of 2008, and June of 
2009. (8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p.261, L.6 - p.264, L.13; Supp. R., pp.751-57 (Defendant's E.H. 
Ex. CC).) Mr. MacGregor said he helped Lane by contacting the prosecutor, 
Mr. Thompson, and asking him to keep Lane out of prison, even though it was not part of 
his agreement in exchange for Lane's testimony. (Id.) Mr. MacGregor said he heard from 
22 Mr. MacGregor's response to Lane's bar complaint is Defendant's sealed evidentiary 
hearing Exhibit V. Mr. MacGregor testified that he did not acknowledge the $1,500 
payment to Lane when he responded to Lane's complaint through the Idaho State Bar. 
(8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p.255, L.13 - p.260, L.21.) The Court refused to admit Exhibit V, even 
though Mr. MacGregor testified about it and acknowledged it was his response, because 
the Court deemed it to be hearsay. (8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p.267, L.11 - p.270, L.5.) The 
defense did not offer the statement as an admission of a party opponent under Idaho Rule 
of Evidence 801. 
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Lane again in February of 2010 when he received a phone call from him, but he refused 
to accept the call or intervene on Lane's behalf (8/5/13 Tr., p.264, Ls.14-25.) 
Mr. MacGregor admitted he never disclosed Lane's early release from the rider program 
to defense counsel. (8/5/13 Tr., p.278, L.25 p.279, L.3.) 
Although Lane was subpoenaed to testify at the evidentiary hearing, he refused to 
do so, invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. (8/6/13 E.H. 
Tr., p.419, L.3 - p.420, L.11.) Lane's attorney at the evidentiary hearing advised the 
Court and the parties that he had been informed by counsel for the State that it would file 
perjury charges against Lane if he were to testify at the evidentiary hearing contrary to 
what he said in 2008, and if the Court deemed that testimony to be false. (8/6/13 E.H. 
Tr., p.419, L.10 p.420, L.4.) As a result of Lane's refusal to testify, the bar complaint 
he filed against the prosecutor alleging the prosecutor coerced him to testify falsely 
against Mark, and that the $1,500 he received was part of the deal he made with 
prosecutors prior to testifying against Mark, was deemed inadmissible.23 
Nevertheless, it is undisputed the State failed to disclose to defense counsel that in 
exchange for Lane's testimony against Mark, the State agreed in December of 2007 or 
January of 2008 to help Lane get out of Cottonwood/the retained jurisdiction program 
and on probation. It is also clear the prosecutor never disclosed the $1,500 payment to 
Lane. While it requires a healthy degree of faith and willful ignorance to believe the 
23 See Sealed E.H. Ex. U; Supp. R., pp.873-880 (concluding Exhibit U contained newly 
discovered evidence relevant to questions regarding Lane Thomas's trial testimony and 
its veracity; but deeming it inadmissible hearsay with court observing the exhibit 
contained two unswom statements made by Lane on 5/31/10 and 6/10/10). 
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prosecutor's claim that both the $1,500, and his repeated efforts to keep Lane out of 
prison despite Lane's numerous and serious alleged probation violations (Supp. 
R., pp. 754-57), were not part of its deal with Lane in exchange for his testimony, it is 
clear the agreement to get him out of prison was. Moreover, the State allowed Lane's 
false testimony that he was hoping the prosecutor's letter of cooperation would help him 
get probation after his rider, and his testimony that the State had never extended any offer 
to him to testify until the night before he testified, to go uncorrected. As a result, Lane 
was never impeached with this information, which would have shown incredible motive 
for Lane to testify for the State and against Mark, and destroyed his claim that he was 
testifying because he just wanted to be honest. 24 
The State's need for Lane's testimony was made clear by the Opinion of the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals when it returned Mark's case to Idaho state court for retrial: 
Although there is overwhelming evidence that one or both of the Lankford 
brothers killed the Bravences, only Bryan's testimony singled out Mark as 
the killer. There were no witnesses to the murder, and no murder weapon 
was admitted into evidence. There was no forensic or circumstantial 
evidence suggesting that Mark, rather than Bryan, beat the victims to 
death. Bryan's testimony was vital to the prosecution, and instruction 15 
allowed the jury to convict Mark on Bryan's word alone, in obvious 
violation of Idaho law. Moreover, Bryan had every incentive to lie: If 
Mark did not kill the Bravences, then Bryan must have done the deed. 
Additionally, Bryan thought he had a deal to avoid the death penalty in 
exchange for his testimony against his brother. See Lankford v. Idaho, 500 
U.S. 110, 120-121, 111 S.Ct. 1723, 114 L.Ed.2d 173 (1991); State v. 
Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 903 P.2d 1305, 1309 (1995). This is precisely 
the declared purpose for Idaho's corroboration requirement: "to offset the 
danger that an accomplice may wholly fabricate testimony, inculpating an 
24 Lane's recantation of his claim that Mark confessed to him was well documented in the 
letter sent from Lane's attorney to the prosecutor, including all the reasons Lane's 
counsel was concerned about the credibility of Lane's claim that Mark confessed to him; 
the letter also expressed concern about the prosecutor's insistence on making Lane 
testify. (Supp. R., pp.740-41 (Defendant's E.H. Ex. J (Letter from Mr. Ramalingam to 
Mr. McGregor regarding Lane Thomas's testimony)).) 
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innocent person, in order to purchase immunity from prosecution, or 
lenient treatment, for his own complicity in the crime." State v. Pierce, 
107 Idaho 96, 685 P.2d 837, 842 (Ct.App.1984) ( citations omitted). 
The only evidence tending to show that Mark was the killer was his 
brother's word.. . . . There was ample evidence that either one or both of 
the Lankfords killed the Bravences, but there was no evidence that Mark 
attacked and killed the Bravences other than Bryan's testimony, and there 
was strong evidence raised at the habeas proceedings suggesting that 
Bryan's testimony is inconsistent with the forensic evidence. Counsel's 
request that the jury be instrncted that it could convict on the basis of 
Bryan's testimony alone was plainly prejudicial. 
Lankford v. Arave, 468 F.3d 578, 586-87, 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2006). 
Moreover, in denying the defense's motion for acquittal, the district court 
acknowledged the important role Lane's testimony played at trial, concluding "if it were 
just Bryan Lankford this would be a lot tougher decision. But with the testimony of Lane 
Thomas I find it much easier to deny the motion." (Tr., p.1580, Ls.3-13.) 
For these reasons, Mark has established a Napue violation by showing the State 
elicited or presented false or perjured testimony from Lane Thomas, or allowed false or 
pe1jured testimony to go uncorrected. Because of the importance of corroborating 
evidence to the State's case against Mark, it is clear Lane's false testimony may have had 
an effect on the outcome of the trial, or could have, in any reasonable likelihood, affected 
the judgment of the jury. As a result, Mark is entitled to a new trial based on the Napue 
violation alone. 
Mark has also shown the State willfully suppressed exculpatory impeachment 
evidence regarding Lane Thomas and that he was prejudiced as a result. The district 
court's conclusion that it would have seriously entertained Mark's motion for acquittal 
were it not for Lane's testimony demonstrates that prejudice. Prejudice resulting from a 
Brady violation is shown when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence 
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been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different; that 
is, the evidence must undermine confidence in the verdict. Given the importance of 
Lane's testimony to Mark's conviction, it cannot be said the evidence of Lane's motives 
to testify for the State and against Mark are insignificant. 
The prosecutor's commission of Brady and Napue violations was misconduct that 
deprived Mark of due process and a fair trial. The prejudice flowing from those violations 
has been explained above, and Mark is entitled to a new trial. 
b. Prosecution's Undisclosed Deal With Bryan And Elicitation Of 
False Testimony 
Bryan testified against Mark on February 8, 2008, and as previously noted, 
testified that it was Mark, not him, who killed the Bravences. Bryan admitted to changing 
his story on multiple occasions but only "to survive in prison." (Tr., p.1322, L.23 
p.1323, L.2.) He testified that he was afraid for his life in prison because of his testimony 
against Mark, not necessarily because of reprisals from Mark, but because prisons are run 
by gangs and gangs "don't like rats ... or snitches." (Tr., p.1323, Ls.2-10.) Bryan 
admitted to testifying in court under oath on prior occasions and giving a different story 
than he told Agent Ploeger when he was arrested, and a story that was different from his 
in-court testimony on February 8. (Tr., p.1323, L.11 p.1324, L.6.) Bryan claimed he 
gave different stories and lied under oath because he was afraid if he did not, he would be 
killed by gang members or friends of Mark. (Tr., p.1324, Ls.10-12.) 
Bryan admitted when he testified in court in 1985, he said he killed the 
Bravences. (Tr., p.1324, Ls.14-22.) Bryan also admitted that he had written numerous 
letters implicating himself and exonerating Mark. (Tr., p.1326, L.13 - p.1327, L.25.) 
Bryan testified that Mark was friends with some of the guards in prison and threatened 
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him that if he did not implicate himself in the murders, Mark would talk to his friends. 
(Tr., p.1328, Ls.1-23.) 
Bryan testified that in exchange for his testimony, the prosecutor promised to: get 
him a protection order so he would not have to go back to Boise; try to get him 
transferred out of Idaho and keep the location confidential; help him get a name change; 
help him get his parole hearing moved up seven years, from 2015 to 2008; write a letter 
to the Board of Pardons and Parole advising them Bryan was cooperative in Mark's case; 
give Bryan immunity from any perjury charges for his prior contrary testimony; and 
appear, along with Detective Mealer, and testify at the parole hearing about Bryan's 
cooperation in Mark's case. (Tr., p.1329, L.21 p.1335, L. 18.) This testimony was 
elicited when the prosecutor asked Bryan "is there anything that the prosecutor's office 
has said they would do for you in exchange for your testimony?" (Tr., p.1329, Ls.21-23.) 
If Bryan forgot to mention a part of the deal, the prosecutor would specifically asked him 
about it, but neither Bryan nor the prosecutor made any mention of the cell phone or 
facilitation of communications among Lee John, Bryan, and Bryan's wife, Francoise. 25 
(Tr., p.1329, L.21-p.1335. L.18.) 
On cross, Bryan admitted to confessing, both in court under oath and out of court, 
that he was the one who smashed the Bravences' skulls with a rock, and Mark was not 
there when the Bravences were killed. (Tr., p.1339, L.12 p.1357, L.14.) He admitted to 
writing Mark a letter using an assumed name on October 21, 2007, stating that his 
confession to the murders that was given to Mark's attorney, Andy Parnes, was the truth. 
25 The prosecutor memorialized all the terms of Bryan's plea agreement in letters to 
Bryan's counsel, and Bryan handwrote an additional term in a memo to Mr. MacGregor. 
(Supp. R., pp.668-671 (Defendant's E.H. Bxs. N, 0, P).) 
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(Tr., p.1359, L.4 - p.1360, L.2.) He also admitted to writing other letters where he 
confessed to the murders, swore to the truth of the confessions, and had them notarized. 
(Tr., p.1360, L.l - p.1363, L.25, p.1367, L.4 -- p.1369, L.2.) Bryan admitted that each 
time he testified for the State and implicated Mark, he received a benefit in return. 
(Tr., p.1369, L.6 p.1370, L.5.) He also admitted when he confessed in written 
statements or testimony that he killed the Bravences and Mark was not involved, he was 
not promised anything. (Tr., p.1370, L.6 - p.1373, L.22.) 
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Bryan about each promise the 
prosecutor had made to him in exchange for his testimony, as elicited by the prosecutor 
on direct examination. (Tr., p.1376, L.13 p.1378, L. l .) Bryan admitted that in exchange 
for testifying against Mark, the prosecutor gave him immunity from perjury charges, so 
regardless of what he testified to against Mark, he would not be prosecuted; he would get 
a letter from the prosecutor to the parole board; his parole date would be moved up seven 
years; his name would be changed; and the prosecutor would help get him moved out of 
state. (Tr., p.1376, L.13 p.1378, L.l.) 
Through independent investigation after the trial, Mark discovered Bryan had 
once again recanted his trial testimony.26 In addition, Mark learned that Bryan had a cell 
phone the entire time he was in Idaho County Jail; according to an email the prosecutor 
26 Bryan's recantations and claims of assaults, threats and coercion by the Idaho County 
prosecutor and Sheriffs office are contained in his federal habeas petition filed in 2010, 
which includes his affidavits wherein he maintains the prosecutor coached him and Lane 
Thomas for two and half months regarding their testimony against Mark. (Supp. 
R., pp.647-663 (Def. E.H. Exs. G and H).) When Bryan invoked his Fifth Amendment 
rights and refused to testify at the evidentiary hearing, the trial court refused to admit the 
documents based on the State's hearsay objections, even though the pleading was under 
oath and subject to the penalty of perjury. 
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sent to Bryan's wife, Bryan was in Idaho County Jail as of December 6, 2007. (Supp. 
R., p.778 (Defendant's E.H. Ex. HH).) Detective Mealer testified and confirmed Bryan 
had access to a cell phone while in Idaho County Jail; Detective Mealer testified Bryan 
had received the cell phone from him, but he had provided the phone at the direction of 
the prosecutor, Mr. MacGregor. (8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p.188, L.11 - p.189, L. 13.) The 
detective testified he was not aware of other jail inmates having access to cell phones 
while in custody. (8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p.189, Ls.1-13, p.195, Ls.8-15, p.198, Ls.2-23.) The 
detective testified he would not be surprised to learn Bryan had recanted his trial 
testimony because in his opinion, Bryan's "a weasel, a snitch. You know, so there - they 
-they can go either way. Doesn't mean it's not true, but depending on what's in front of 
them, they may change their story." (8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p.191, Ls.15-25.) He testified at 
Bryan's parole hearing only because the prosecutor made an agreement that he would do 
so in exchange for Bryan's trial testimony. (8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p.192, Ls.14-24.) 
Mr. MacGregor testified he had Bryan brought to Idaho County Jail prior to trial. 
(8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p.210, L.19 p.211, L.3.) He facilitated Bryan having a cell phone 
while at the jail so he could talk to his wife, Francoise, but asked Detective Mealer to 
check the phone periodically to make sure Bryan was not using it to contact other people. 
(8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p.211, L.9 p.212, L.24.) Mr. MacGregor admitted facilitating other 
communications between Bryan and Francoise, as well as Bryan and his brother, Lee 
John. (8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p.213, L.66 - p.213, L.16; Supp. R., p.778 (Defendant's E.H. Ex. 
HH).) He admitted he did not disclose the cell phone or facilitation of communications 
among Bryan, Lee John and Francoise to the defense. (8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p.214 L.17 
p.216, L.12.) Mr. MacGregor also bought Bryan breakfast cereal and hard candy while he 
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was in the Idaho County Jail. (8/6/13 E.H. Tr., p.303, Ls.2-19.) Mr. MacGregor testified 
that Bryan lost his cell phone privileges for a few days when Detective Mealer checked 
the phone and saw that Bryan was calling people other than Francoise. (8/6/13 E.H. 
Tr., p.303, L.20 p.304, L.5.) All told, Mr. MacGregor believed Bryan was in Idaho 
County Jail for three to four months--during which time he had a cell phone--and during 
that time, Mr. MacGregor met with Bryan eight to ten times prior to trial, and one or two 
times after trial. (8/6/ l 3 E.H. Tr., p. 305, L.19 p. 306, L.2.) 
Mr. MacGregor knew ofno actual threats Mark made against Bryan, but just took 
Bryan's word for it. (8/5/13 E.H. Tr., p.218, L.19 - p.220, L.20.) Other than Bryan's 
testimony, no evidence was presented at Mark's trial of any threats, injuries or assaults 
Bryan suffered from the time of his affest in 1983 to the time of his testimony in 2008 
because of Mark or his testimony against Mark. 27 
Bryan's testimony was already compromised based on the information the 
defense knew about his propensity to lie under oath and testify falsely, giving the 
prosecutor a fifty-fifty chance at the outset of knowing that presenting testimony from 
Bryan would be suborning pe1jury. In addition to the defense's impeachment of Bryan 
based on his known and disclosed credibility problems, Bryan's testimony would have 
been substantially undermined had jurors been told the prosecutor gave Bryan a cell 
phone while he was in jail and allowed him to use it to contact his wife, and whomever 
else he chose, and that the prosecutor facilitated communications between Bryan and his 
brother, Lee John Lankford, an important State witness at trial against Mark. Lee John 
27 Mark's IDOC disciplinary records reveal no history of violence. (Supp. R., pp.759-773 
(Defendant's E.H. Ex. EE).) 
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testified and corroborated aspects of Bryan's testimony relating to Mark having a purple 
club that he always carried around, and which Bryan had testified Mark used to assault 
the Bravences. (Tr., p.1500, L.8 p.1521, L.13.) The fact that pretrial communications 
occurred between Lee John and Bryan would have been devastating to Bryan's 
testimony, as well Lee John's testimony, not to mention the prosecutor's credibility 
before the jury. 
Had this information been disclosed prior to trial, defense counsel could have 
subpoenaed Bryan's phone records and gained a detailed account of who Bryan was 
calling and how long his conversations were. As Mr. MacGregor acknowledged, the cell 
phone was taken away from Bryan for a few days when Detective Mealer checked it and 
discovered Bryan was calling people other than Francoise. The defense could have 
impeached both Bryan and Lee John about their pretrial discussions of Mark's case and 
any collusion between the two in formulating their trial testimony. The defense could 
have also introduced evidence that inmates having access to cell phones-let alone a cell 
phone to themselves at the direction of the prosecutor-- either at the jail or the prison, is 
unheard of, unless they possess such devices illegally. 
According to Mr. MacGregor's email to Francoise, he had regular conversations 
with Lee John and facilitated a call between Bryan and Lee John in hopes that he would 
convince Bryan to testify against Mark. (Supp. R., p.778 (Defendant's E.H. Ex. HH).) 
Lee John was a State's witness, as was Bryan. The prosecutor had no business facilitating 
and encouraging discussions about Mark's case between two State witnesses. 
The State elicited Bryan's testimony explaining the deal he was getting m 
exchange for his testimony against Mark, which omitted both the cell phone and the 
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prosecutor's facilitation of communications among Bryan, Francoise and Lee John. In 
doing so, the prosecutor elicited perjured testimony or, at the very least, allowed false 
testimony to go uncorrected. Mark has established a Napue violation on this basis. To 
convict Mark, as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals observed, the State had to present 
evidence that he, and not Bryan, committed the crime, or that the two committed the 
crime together. Bryan's testimony was necessary for the purpose of establishing Mark 
was the guilty party, not Bryan. It is clear Bryan's false testimony regarding the benefits 
he was receiving for his testimony may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial, or 
could have, in any reasonable likelihood, affected the judgment of the jury. As a result, 
Mark is entitled to a new trial based on the Napue violation alone. 
Mark has also shown the State willfully suppressed exculpatory impeachment 
evidence about Bryan's deal with the State in exchange for his testimony, and that he was 
prejudiced as a result. Prejudice resulting from a Brady violation is shown when there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different; that is, the evidence must undermine 
confidence in the verdict. Given the importance of Bryan's testimony to Mark's 
conviction, it cannot be said the evidence of Bryan's motives to lie and testify against 
Mark and for the State, are insignificant. 
The prosecutor's commission of numerous Brady and Napue violations was 
misconduct that deprived Mark of due process and a fair trial. The prejudice flowing 
from those violations has been explained above, and Mark is entitled to a new trial. 
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V. 
THE ACCUMULATION OF ERRORS REQUIRES REVERSAL OF MARK'S 
CONVICTION AND REMAND FOR A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE ERRORS 
DEPRIVED MARK OF DUE PROCESS AND HIS RIGHT TO AF AIR TRIAL 
Even if each individual instance of en-or and misconduct identified herein is not 
sufficient, standing alone, to wan-ant a new trial, the errors, when taken as a whole, 
denied Mark of his constitutional right to due process and a fair trial, requiring vacation 
of his convictions and remand for a new trial. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230-31 
(2010); State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572-73 (2007). 
VI. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING MARK'S RULE 35 MOTION 
BECAUSE IT WAS FILED MORE THAN 120 DAYS AFTER THE ENTRY OF THE 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND SENTENCE 
A. Introduction 
Mark asked the district court to correct his illegal sentence, asserting the following 
grounds: (1) he was denied his constitutional right to self-representation; (2) his 
conviction was premised on perjury/the prosecutor's subornation of perjured testimony 
from Lee John Lankford; (3) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by lying about 
Mark's prior record and relying upon Mark's grandmother's prior testimony, even though 
the State never showed his grandmother was deceased and therefore, unavailable; and (4) 
the Court erroneously relied upon testimony from non-immediate family members at 
sentencing, in violation of Idaho Code section 19-5306. (Supp. R., pp.9-15.) The State 
opposed the motion, arguing it was filed more than 120 days after the entry of judgment, 
rendering it untimely and depriving the district court of jurisdiction to consider it. (Supp. 
R., pp.18-19.) The motion was not argued before the assigned judge until after the district 
court denied Mark's second motion for a new trial, and the Court denied the Rule 35 
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motion, concluding it was filed untimely. (2/25/14 Tr., p.7, L. l - p.38, L.25; Supp. 
R., pp.957-963.) 
B. Standard Of Review 
A district court's denial of a Rule 35 motion premised on the correction of an 
illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, involves a question of law, 
which this Court freely reviews. State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 840-41 (2013); 
State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 839 (2011); State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 601 (2011). A 
Rule 35 motion premised on the correction of a sentence imposed in an illegal manner 
must be filed within 120 days of the entry of the judgment imposing sentence. State v. 
Adair, l 45 Idaho 514, 516 (2008). 
C. The District Court Erred In Denying Mark's Rule 35 Motion Because It Was Not 
Filed More Than 120 Days After The Entry Of The Judgment Of Conviction And 
Sentence 
The district court erred in dismissing Mark's pro se Rule 35 motion for 
untimeliness, where Mark submitted the motion to the prison mailroom on November 15, 
2008, within the 120 day Rule 35 deadline. (Supp. R., p.15.) The district court imposed 
sentence on July 17, 2008, ordering Mark to serve two fixed life sentences consecutively, 
and the judgment of conviction was entered July 22, 2008. (Tr., p.2107, L.23 - p.2108, 
L.4; R., pp.495-96.) Thereafter, his trial counsel filed a notice of appeal on August 22nd, 
followed by a motion filed August 27, 2008, to appoint the Idaho State Appellate Public 
Defender (SAPD) to represent Mark. (R., pp.500-01, 504-10.) The following day, the 
Court appointed the SAPD to represent Mark. (R., pp.502-03.) Mark filed his Rule 35 
motion prose on November 15, 2008, by submitting it to the prison mail room, but it was 
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not formally filed by the district court clerk until November 21, 2008. (Supp. R., pp.9, 
15.) 
The district court held a hearing on the Rule 35 motion on January 22, 2009. 
(1/22/09 Tr., passim.) At that hearing, the State argued the motion was untimely, having 
been filed 122 days after judgment was entered. (1/22/09 Rule 35 Hrg. Tr., p.4, L.22 
p.5, L.18.) The defense responded that the motion was timely filed (1/22/09 Rule 35 Hrg. 
Tr., p.5, L.21 -- p.6, L.9), and further noted the motion had been brought prose; defense 
counsel noted he was unaware of the motion, had done nothing regarding the motion, and 
would not be arguing the motion, Mark would. (1/22/09 Rule 35 Hrg. Tr., p.6, L.24 -- p.7, 
L.8.) Because Mark had been assaulted in prison and had not been allowed to bring his 
legal work, and because he was medicated, dizzy and confused, Mark asked the Court to 
extend the date to consider the motion, which the Court granted. (1/22/09 Rule 35 Hrg. 
Tr., p.7, L.13 --p.8, L.15.) 
The motion was argued on February, 12, 2009, and the Court again denied the 
State's motion to dismiss for untimeliness, noting some of the claims involved the 
correctness of the sentence and were not subject to the 120 day rule. (2/12/09 Rule 35 
Hrg. Tr., p.14, L.20 - p.15, L.3, p.22, L.8 - p.27, L.13.) Defense counsel argued the 
claims in the motion, while Mark argued the prison mailbox rule applied, rendering his 
Rule 35 motion timely filed. (2/12/09 Rule 35 Hrg. Tr., p.15, L.4 - p.19, L.16.) At that 
hearing, the Court noted the matter was submitted. (2/12/09 Rule 35 Hrg. Tr., p.32, Ls.3-
11.) Thereafter, a number of changes to appointed counsel, the prosecutor and the 
presiding judge occurred. Subsequently, the Rule 35 was argued to the assigned judge on 
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February 24, 2014, who dismissed the motion as untimely and found the prison mailbox 
rule inapplicable. (2/24/14 Rule 35 Hrg. Tr., passim; Supp. R., pp.957-963.) 
The prison mailbox mle essentially "deems a prose inmate's document filed as of 
the date it was submitted to prison authorities for the purpose of mailing to the court for 
filing." State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 62 (Ct. App. 2011). Idaho appellate courts have 
recognized application of the prison mailbox rule to pro se inmate filings in post-
conviction cases, to notices of appeal, and Rule 35 motions. Munson v. State, 128 Idaho 
639, 643 (1996) (applying prison mailbox rule to prose post-conviction petition); State v. 
Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205 (Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing the Idaho Supreme Court applied 
mailbox mle to defendant's notice of appeal even though defendant was represented by 
the Ada County Public Defender's Office and that office had not withdrawn from 
representation of the defendant when the defendant filed the notice); State v. Johnson, 
152 Idaho 56, 62-63 (Ct. App.2011) (applying prison mailbox rule to Rule 35 motion to 
correct sentence). 
Specifically, in Lee, the defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal even though he 
was represented by the Ada County Public Defender's Office at the time the notice was 
filed, and the public defender's office had not moved to withdraw from representation. 
117 Idaho at 205. The notice of appeal was received by the clerk 45 days after the district 
court entered judgment from which the appeal was taken, 3 days late. Id. at 204. The 
State argued the Court should dismiss the appeal as untimely. Id. The Court of Appeals 
noted that the timeliness issue had been resolved by the Supreme Court, when it allowed 
the defendant to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed as untimely. Id. The 
defendant filed a verified statement regarding his incarceration and proof that he 
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delivered his notice to the prison on December 30, 1998, for filing, which would have 
been timely had the notice been filed that day. Id. The Supreme Court withdrew its 
conditional dismissal and directed that the defendant's appeal be reinstated. Id. As a 
result, the Court of Appeals found it had jurisdiction to decide the defendant's appeal, 
and rejected the State's arguments in support of dismissal, including the defendant's 
representation by the public defender. Id. 
The facts in Mark's case are indistinguishable from the facts in Lee. Here, Mark's 
trial counsel timely filed a notice of appeal and then moved for the appointment of the 
SAPD, which the district court granted prior to Mark filing his prose Rule 35 motion. As 
trial counsel noted at the January 22, 2009, hearing, he had no involvement in drafting the 
Rule 35 motion, he had not been in contact with Mark at all, and as the record reflects, he 
had not filed a Rule 35 motion on Mark's behalf. Under these circumstances, even if this 
Court concludes Mark was still represented by counsel due to counsels' failure to move 
to withdraw, where the facts demonstrate Mark proceeded pro se on his Rule 35 motion--
without any assistance from appointed counsel--the prison mailbox rule should apply to 
determine the timeliness of the Rule 35 motion. Because Mark's Rule 35 motion was 
timely under the prison mailbox rule, this Court should remand the case back to the 
district court for a decision on the merits of the Rule 35 motion. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should vacate Mark's judgment of conviction 
and sentence and remand his case for a new trial. Alternatively, this Court should vacate the 
district court's order denying Mark's Rule 35 motion as untimely, and remand the case for a 
decision on the merits. 
DATED this 8th day of January, 2015. 
·v .---..·-- .~ ... -.- ... 
S NNON N. ROMERO 
(Cout'lscl for Mark Lankford 
\,_) 
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